Countering Terrorism and the Rule of Law in Yemen: The American Approach to Fighting Al-Qaida

My latest article criticizes the conception that matters of security--in particular counterterrorism operations--are separate from rule of law initiates, focusing on Yemen as its primary case study. It was published by Muftah.

"In a recent speech at West Point, U.S. President Barack Obama called for the establishment of a new $5 billion Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund as a part of a “shift” in U.S. security strategy. The purpose of the fund is to finance training and equipment for countries currently engaged in counter-terror operations to “maintain order in their own neighborhoods,” thereby alleviating the United States of the burden presumably.

"While Obama affirmed the United States’ desire to support the rule of law—which the State Department has recognized to be in line with battling extremism— the president stopped short of linking this support to his counterterrorism fund. Obama also failed to acknowledge that the erosion and bastardization of the rule of law in parts of the Middle East is largely happening under the auspices of the fight against terrorism. Although described by the president as a country that has successfully “gone on the offensive” against terrorists, Yemen clearly demonstrates the failure of this narrow obsession with counterterrorism."

Read the full article here.

The Mosul Crisis: Origins and Prospects

After a five-day campaign, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has seized most of Mosul, the provincial capital of Nineveh in northwestern Iraq. The Iraqi security forces largely abandoned their posts, effectively ceding the city to the transnational jihadists of ISIS. The time to act is now. Though Iraq is not at risk of outright collapse, it is on the verge of a major cataclysm. Political progress, particularly with the Sunni communities victimized by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's thuggish form of governance of the past few years, could have a transformative effect on the wider region.

Background to the current crisis

ISIS is the successor to the United States' old enemy al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), but due to a falling out with al-Qaeda's core leadership, the group has since begun a campaign of savagery wholly independent of other al-Qaeda affiliates, becoming the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). During 2012, the capacity of Iraq's government began to swell. But as the Syrian uprising snowballed into the civil war it is today, ISI saw an opportunity to capitalize on Syria's desperate Sunni population. In 2013 ISIS expanded its operations to Syria where government power was on the wane.  Thus ISI became ISIS, and it began courting new constituencies outside the borders of Iraq. Though operations in Iraq where never entirely dormant, ISIS's attention became focused on territory seized in eastern Syria.

Though much of the credit for the end or Iraq's bloody civil war is attributed by Western military analysts to the surge that began in 2007, a critical component of the civil wars end was the so-called Sahwa (Awakening) that occurred within Iraq's Sunni population. Iraq's post-civil war order was far from perfect, but there at least seemed to be the promise of rapprochement between political blocs that largely aligned themselves according to ethnic or sectarian backgrounds. Unfortunately, despite some positive signs, Sunnis in Iraq continue to be disenfranchised and lingering grievances continue to serve as open wounds, exacerbating relations with Baghdad and eroding broader faith in the national project.

ISIS continued to covertly expand its contacts in Western Iraq as it continued to acquire battle experience and better equipment and funding from its efforts in Syria. Unlike other rebel groups in Syria, ISIS's goal is not simply the end of the Assad regime, but the construction of a fascist state with pretense of extremist pan-Islamic trappings. Funded by extortion rackets and black market oil sales, feeding off disenfranchised and desperate constituencies in both Syria and Iraq, and now armed better than ever before, ISIS can safely be said to be stronger today than it during any of its previous incarnations.

2013 in particular was a devastating year for the potential for a new political order in Iraq--a boon for ISIS' opportunistic recruiters. The year began with a crackdown on a protest sit-in in Hawija, where the government admits twenty-seven people were killed; the protesters claim almost twice as much lost their lives, with 120 wounded and many more in prison. Another protest in December 2013 was dispersed with similar brutality in Ramadi. The protesters demands are not uncommon; they are indeed echoed elsewhere in the region calling for an end to disenfranchisement, discrimination, and access to economic opportunity. Following the incident in Ramadi, an uprising began in earnest and ISIS clearly realized the time was right to begin making moves, and has since seized Fallujah and parts of Ramadi. They've staged numerous attacks around the country beyond the bounds of Anbar province, threatening to re-mobilize Shia militias and plunge the country back to the bloodiest days of the 2007-2008 civil war.

Prospects for the Future: Three Scenarios

1: ISIS keeps Mosul and continues to capture other Iraqi cities? Incredibly doubtful. The idea that ISIS can keep Mosul would be completely laughable if not for the corruption and ineptitude of Iraq's security forces. However, ISIS's expansion in Iraq comes with obvious limitations. Even with the current alliances gained with some Sunni tribes in the West, further gains would require new constituencies that ISIS is simply unable to cultivate. More to the point, most of Iraq's population--the Sunnis included--are completely opposed to ISIS. The semi-autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) is the most serious threat to the jihadists at the moment. ISIS's advance to Mosul, far too close to the KRG, will prove to be very similar to Icarus flying too close to the sun. The Peshmerga, the KRG's own security forces, are currently poised near Mosul, at the very least to contain the crisis from spilling over into their own environs, but no doubt willing to assist in efforts to purge the city of ISIS marauders. Despite the likelihood that ISIS will fail here, they have already succeeded in capturing heavy weapons used by the Iraqi military. Already there are reports of US humvees captured in Mosul being seen in Syria.

2: ISIS loses Mosul and the conflict returns to what it was before June 10? The most likely outcome. With ISIS defeat in Mosul seemingly certain, the most likely scenario is that the conflict reverts back to its previous incarnation. With Anbar in chaos as ISIS and other groups use it as a base for attacks around Iraq, slowly but surely increasing tensions. Rather than actually retaining Mosul, this is the scenario that actors should be most concerned about as--aside from being very likely--it is also the formative threat to the viability of Iraq. ISIS does not have the capacity to conquer town by town the entire country. It's simply unfeasible. But, operating from the safety of Anbar as the Iraq government continues its bumbling response, it threatens to exacerbate tensions and plunge the country back into civil war.

3: A turning point toward a new Iraq? Difficult, but certainly worth the effort. The current impasse in Iraq has the potential to mobilize Iraqis on a national level. This is an existential threat that will require a genuine initiative of confidence-building and conflict resolution. The fact that every party in Iraq has a stake in this fight means that Iraq could be on the verge of a unity heretofore unheard in the country. It's important that this potential be realized both within Iraq and by outside observers, and all parties act to realize such a possibility. Iraq needs a new political order, and it must commit now to security sector reform. That's no easy task in the middle of such a conflict, but those same security forces are largely responsible for said conflict. The fact that Mosul was taken so quickly is a testament to the cowardice and clientelism of these security forces and has further eroded the government's credibility. Admitting that their performance has been until now wholly unacceptable will not shock anyone--likely not even the security forces. The government should commit to effective security forces that are curtailed by the rule of law and whose purpose are to serve and protect the people of Iraq.

Recommendations

• Press the central government to make concessions. This, really, should be the axis around which other international action be taken. The government has to appease its citizens--not ISIS. The political violence in western Iraq is largely the result of an anti-government uprising that ISIS is capitalizing on to make its gains. If the government can win back its citizens in the western provinces, ISIS will be defeated. It's by no means a simple task, but if such a complex endeavor could be realized it would indeed  function as a silver bullet. 
• Maliki must go. The first order of business should be for Iraq's political landscape to maneuver to oust Maliki. This part should be easy enough. Though he won the most votes during the April 30 elections, he did not win a majority and can still be beaten by a coalition. Moreover, if his own State of Law Coalition can be convinced to choose a new candidate that is not Maliki, this could signal to Iraqis that change is indeed on the way and that the personalized, clientelistic rule of Maliki is soon coming to an end.
• Pay the Peshmerga. The KRG has largely been on the verge of secession. Paying its security forces could be the first step to rebuilding the Kurdish buy-in into the Iraqi political process. They will be essential in defeating ISIS, who currently seems to have eyes on Kirkuk and Baghdad, not Erbil. ISIS likely rightly assesses KRG coherency and capacity as a dead end. It's important nonetheless to secure Kurdish support for the government's coming offensive against ISIS.
• Address Sunni grievances in the West. To deprive ISIS of its safe-havens in western Iraq, the government must make an effort to recapture the buy-in of aggrieved tribesmen and others that have joined ISIS. These types of alliances--be they in Iraq or Yemen or Syria--are often temporary and based on localized material and political demands rather than some grand ideology like those touted by transnational jihadist groups like ISIS. By meeting with Sunni leaders, releasing political prisoners, and outright repealing "debaathifaction" laws the Iraq government restore some confidence that will allow it to pursue broader reforms and further erode support for ISIS.
• National Dialogue. Iraq would do well to pursue a serious national dialogue, learning from other experiences in the region. There are precedents from Yemen and Tunisia that have important lessons to teach the region and can help heal the deep wounds in society. Maliki recently announced such an effort, but the problem now is that no one has any faith in his ability to execute such a program with any degree of sincerity. 
• Engage Iraq's neighbors. Getting support for Maliki's ouster and for the reforms needed to put the pieces of Iraq back together into something coherent and stable will require a multilateral effort. It would likely require, simultaneously Gulf states, Iran, and the United States to agree on policy toward Iraq. (*Gulp*) Again, as insurmountable as that idea might seem, all of these actors oppose ISIS with vigor and understand that the group represents a threat to their interests. All of these actors have a vested interest in avoiding a civil war in Iraq. There are numerous issues that may stand in the way, be it the Syrian conflict or Iran's nuclear program or whatever the latest squabble is, but there is room for consensus among Iraq's most influential interlopers. For better or worse, these states all wield considerable influence on Iraq's domestic politics and they will have to be confronted if a coherent, effective policy is to succeed.
• Beware of military support. The Iraq government needs military support, but such efforts should be mindful of the military's past performance and abuses. There are numerous reason to be weary. The Iraqi army has used its military to crush political opponents, and empowering the government may only erode conflict resolution efforts and discredit international support if the military continues with previous abuses. Furthermore the gains made by ISIS have resulted in heavy weapons--much of which supplied by the US--falling into ISIS hands which only escalates the severity of the conflict. All international actors giving assistance to the government Iraq should make it clear that such aid is conditional on fighting transnational jihadists and not turning them on disgruntled domestic political factions. Already, Maliki has announced his intention to pay anyone willing to fight ISIS, which only threatens to reform militias not accountable to the government.
• Aid for IDPs. Internally displaced persons (IDP) have been flooding into neighboring provinces from western provinces for months, and now Mosul can be included in said cataclysm. It's important that these people in need not be left in dire straits for too long lest the become vulnerable to the temptation of political violence themselves in some form or another. 

Thoughts on a Palestinian Unity Government

The announcement of a Palestinian unity government, ending the disastrous seven-year long schism, has been greeted by most of the world as a positive step. The United Nations, the European Union, the United States, and many others have voiced their conditional support for the new Hamas-inclusive government--the condition being that the new government maintain peaceful relations with Israel. Despite the unexpected support for the new unity arrangement by the United States, Israel--now continuing a forty-seven year occupation--has rejected it. It will be important for supporters of the unity deal to put together cogent strategies of engagement, hopefully with some level of coordination and with clear goals in mind.

First, it will take a sober assessment of the limits of the agreement. There are still aspects of the agreement that remain to be negotiated and more still that remain to be implemented. The positive news thus far is that both of the primary parties--Fatah and Hamas--remain committed to the difficult tasks ahead. The most challenging issues appear to be negotiating the new security arrangements and effective reimbursement of public sector employee salaries. That being said, the new status quo is still fragile, and there are sure to be numerous attempts at spoiling the process, be they provocations from Israel or armed Palestinian groups. Those international allies currently supporting the unity effort would do well to prepare response to such attempts with conflict resolution-oriented efforts that emphasizes patience and consensus. If unity is the first step toward a transition from occupation to independence--and I do believe this is very much possible however far away--then it is time to focus on Palestinian institutions now rather than wait for the ever elusive silver-bullet style agreement.

In terms of vision, Palestinian factions are calling for parliamentary and presidential elections, despite details about said processes still up for negotiation. It is imperative to support these elections to give Palestinian unity a legitimacy that relies on popular representation rather than elite bargaining. Furthermore, the international community should reflect on their reaction to the 2006 elections that brought Hamas to power. At the time, the results of the 2006 elections were driven by disillusionment with Fatah (which came to be defined by endemic corruption and political impotence) and Hamas' popularity (which stemmed from social services and the perception of purity due to their previous political aloofness).

Much has changed since 2006. While Hamas' governance in Gaza is likely widely-recognized as a failure, the asterisk of international isolation and Israel's blockade hangs over it. Fatah on the other hand, though little has been done to confront the perception of corruption, seems to have reclaimed some legitimacy in its pursuit of statehood. Prior to 2006 (and for some time after) Fatah and the PLO were viewed as impotent and out of touch when it came to achieving Palestinian national goals. Today, I think it's safe to say they have regained more credibility due to their unilateral moves at the UN.

Regardless of the victor, the international community should be prepared to accept the outcome rather than boycott and defund as they did in 2006. Though their relationship with the Palestinian Authority should no doubt be reconsidered during political upheavals they should attempt to do so in ways that do not further contribute result in the type of social upheaval seen in 2007. The frailty of the Palestinian Authority seems more widely acknowledged these days, so such a path is fortunately much less likely.

The real place for international actors however should be as far removed from matters of legitimacy as possible. Specifically, pro-democracy, pro-peace actors like the United States, European Union, and the United Nations can get back to much needed development projects emphasizing the rule of law and economic development. The Palestinian Authority's legitimacy under Fatah was largely eroded as their autocratic tendencies began to be viewed--rightly or wrongly--as part of a collaborative effort to appease Israeli concerns. Facilitating good governance in the Palestinian Authority through reform of corrupt, opaque, and abuse-prone institutions will serve to empower a moderate, politically-engaged civil society that would further the cause of peace far more than the typically and eternally failing negotiation efforts that international actors have heretofore shown myopic loyalty.

Why Egypt Needs a National Dialogue and Why it Won't Get One

Egypt's presidential election was decided long ago. Though Egyptians--at the time of this writing--have yet to vote, Abdul Fattah El-Sisi is sure to win due to a political environment defined intimidation, exclusion, and state-sponsored propaganda. However, given that the election is already decided, there is no reason to wait when considering what the country needs next. Given the divisive state of Egyptian society right now, it is critical that the country find away to reunite, and the best way to complete this process is by way of a national dialogue.

Recent polling has discovered that 38% of Egyptians maintain a favorable view of the Muslim Brotherhood. After the abysmal performance and subsequent military-expulsion of Muhammad Morsi, this comes as a surprise to many--including veteran observers. But this new information further confirms that the rift is widening as well as calcifying, especially since the government chose to ban the group as a terrorist organization. Moreover political violence has become an unfortunate daily occurrence, the likes of which was until very recently completely foreign to Egypt.

Yemen's recent experience with its National Dialogue Conference (NDC) provides the most invaluable lessons. Though the government has since staggered when it comes to implementation--due to a carefully orchestrated political deadlock--the process itself was productive and inclusive. By holding smaller sessions throughout the country, Yemen's NDC was able to cultivate national conversations while airing grievances between otherwise intractable political and social foes. The mechanisms of the NDC led to a long, detailed list of recommendations meant to guide the Constitution Drafting Committee as it prepares Yemen's first post-revolutionary legal code. Egypt, which has yet to pursue a trans-social dialogue processes, has fumbled through three different constitutions since 2011--the latest draft of which was ratified by the public in a dismal referendum with only 38% support.

Egypt's nizam will no doubt remain antithetical to Egyptian solidarity, and it is doubtful that Sisi would have the courage or will to spend political capital in defying the military interests in such away. Indeed, if the government now were to organize such a process it would no doubt resemble the Bahraini model--with loyalists talking among themselves while the opposition boycotted or was excluded altogether. Nonetheless, this should not preclude activists and civil society professionals from mimicking the mechanisms of national dialogue. Dialogue from the bottom up could serve as an important mode of repairing the fractures within Egyptian society and alleviating the currently toxic level of polarization.

Towards an End of Impunity in the Middle East and North Africa

The issue of impunity forms the axis around which all abuses in the Middle East and North Africa continue to revolve. Even where there are legal means to ban abuses or to ensure personal rights, repression continues largely because institutions are too weak or too unwilling to hold violators accountable and to uphold the rule of law. The emphasis of reform efforts--by both activists and international actors--should be oriented toward projects that focus on (1) cultivating cultures of transparency and accountability to ensure professional, impartial execution of the rule of law, (2) empowering the state structures with the capacity to control security forces, and (3) creating an apolitical judicial environment that is able to prosecute members of the state without fear of interference or professional and personal reprisals.

Confronting impunity should begin by opening up what are now very opaque, at times disorganized judiciaries and law enforcement agencies. This is best demonstrated by the lack of transparency in Yemen. Conditions in the country are largely eroded by corruption; money is either required to compel security forces to enforce the law or is a persistent option to convince them to ignore it. Perhaps one of the weakest states in the region, the lack of effective record keeping only serves to complicate basic rule of law procedures. Very little information or access is available to citizens or observers to assess how long certain detainees have been held, whether they've been charged, etc, in part because of government dysfunction and opacity.

Aside from external review, security forces act with impunity first when they elude internal oversight and accountability. This is particularly true in Egypt where security forces operate unmoored from state control, demonstrating an internal cohesion despite a continuous lack of loyalty to a given government--the police forces have been given autonomy for decades and they are intent to maintain it. The Morsi government had virtually no control over security forces, and though the interim government demonstrated a better relationship with police forces, this had no effect on repressive practices. Abdel Fattah El-Sisi will be the next president of Egypt, and his political ascension has been accompanied by improved relations between the police and the state. In other circumstances this may open the door for reform, however this would require a government that was truly interested in reform and had the will to engage its political capital on such a difficult and contested issue as security sector reform; Sisi, to say the least, does not seem predisposed to such a government.

In a similar vein, many of Libya’s human rights abuses stem a lack of government control over the parts of security forces comprised of post-revolutionary militias that have yet to demobilize or completely declare allegiances to the state. It is difficult to say whether various abuses occur more or less today than they did under Qaddafi, but what is demonstrably true is that many armed factions are now far removed from any political or judicial hierarchy in the absence of the Qaddafi regime’s monopolization of violence. Torture, wrongful imprisonment, religious persecution, sexual assault, and other abuses have all occurred at the hands of these militias, yet the government continues to utilize such forces in various parts of the country to compliment its own security apparatus. As yet, the government has not demonstrated an ability or will to investigate and punish abuses. The development of a strong constitution is the first step, but ultimately the fate of the country will rest upon whether these quasi (or wholly) independent groups can be convinced to declare loyalty to said document and then be contained by its legal parameters. The way forward for Libya thus lies not only in reform and institution building, but these difficult processes are further complicated by the thorny process of conflict resolution and negotiation.

The Egyptian judiciary’s role in selectively prosecuting and convicting people for transgressions is important to consider. Torture, arbitrary arrest, and extrajudicial killings are more commonplace today than they were in 2010, and there have been few attempts to investigate abuses, fewer attempts to press charges, and fewer still successful convictions. Though few members of the security forces--much less the former regime--have been successfully convicted for the deaths of protesters during 2011 uprising or its subsequent violence, numerous citizens and activists and have been condemned. The recent disturbing mass convictions of Muslim Brotherhood supporters and affiliates has rightly brought down international condemnation and concern upon Egypt, but what failed to garner as much outrage was the quiet acquittal of police officers implicated in extrajudicial killings. Though the Egyptian judiciary has independent fragments, cases and courts are still managed in a highly politicized fashion to ensure that the state, particularly the military and the police, can ensure their desired outcomes when they wish.

In Yemen, the wider project of protecting the perpetrators of past abuses is more formalized. The uprising was effectively ended by a power-sharing scheme agreed upon by the Joint Meeting Parties and the General People’s Congress--the former ruling party. The most contentious aspect of the agreement was the immunity law that still serves as an obstacle to pursuing the perpetrators of terrible crimes committed during the uprising, including former President Ali Abdullah Saleh himself, who remains free to manipulate Yemeni politics to this day. This power sharing scheme, which so far has done little more than paralyze the government and exclude popular opinion from the transition process, is a microcosm of larger mechanisms at play that impede accountability. Offending members of the security forces and government officials are often treated lightly--if sanctioned all--for abuses, often for political expedience due to various social sensitivities, like tribal connections.

The region, regrettably, does not lack authoritarian regimes where impunity is commonplace, but it should be understood that impunity is not just an aspect of repressive regimes: it is a central component without which the entire game begins to unravel. The first step is addressing transparency within the system; citizens must be able to see and understand the process. Then all institutions and groups acting in the name of the state--security forces, the judiciary, etc.--should be made to conform to a coherent hierarchy that citizens can trust. Finally, a free and independent judiciary should be molded to ensure that members of the state are held to the same standards as the citizens they are charged with ruling over. If more effort was focused on building the capacity of rule of law institutions, these institutions would largely act on their own accord to purge the system of its remaining poisons.

A Crash Course in Iraq’s Electoral Politics

My article breaking down the political players and major issues in the upcoming Iraqi elections was published on The Atlantic Council's MENASource blog.

"On April 30, Iraq will hold parliamentary elections featuring a total of 9,040 candidates from 142 parties, including forty-one blocs and coalitions, all competing for just 328 parliamentary seats. The result of the 2010 parliamentary elections carried Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiya bloc to a narrow electoral victory, but was eventually defeated by a coalition of majority-Shia parties to ensure a second term for Nuri al-Maliki. As Maliki seeks another four years as Iraq’s prime minister, the political scene has changed dramatically and issues, both new and old, take center stage as voters weigh their options. 

"Security remains at the forefront of Iraqi politics. The civil war in Syria and the transnational jihadist organizations’ activities on Iraq’s western border have exploited and exacerbated long running grievances between the local Sunni population and the central government. The lingering "de-baathification” legacy has been used by Maliki, some say, to discriminate against critics, particularly Sunnis. Following the December 2013 crackdown on the protest camp in Anbar province’s capital of Ramadi and the arrest of prominent Sunni leaders, clashes erupted throughout the province. Currently, organizations like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other militant groups have come to temporary agreements with local anti-government militias and tribal groups. The loss of control in Anbar has threatened the rest of the country as well, with militants seizing control of the Fallujah Dam and closing off the Euphrates river. Its closure has caused flooding in some areas and extreme water scarcity in others. Elsewhere, ISIS forces and other militant groups have staged attacks in Shia neighborhoods, threatening to reignite sectarian tensions and mobilize independent militias. This recent escalation in violence has already claimed 2,650 lives since the beginning of the year."

Read the full article here.

The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Human Rights in the Transitioning Countries

My article contrasting the state of human rights in before and after the Arab Spring was published on The Atlantic Council's MENASource blog. This article was subsequently recommended by Foreign Policy Magazine's Democracy Lab.

"More than three years have passed since tide of the Arab Spring swept through the region, carrying away in its undertow three Presidents-for-life as well as one Brother-Leader. At the heart of the movements that coalesced in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen was a desire for democratic reform and a final sunset on the decades-old systems of repression and human rights abuses. However, a comparative view of the current state of human rights today versus that of 2010 reveals the emerging patterns defining the people's relationship with the state in the post-Arab Spring era. The US Department of State’s annual review of human rights provides an opportunity to assess what progress has been made as well as how very far the transitioning countries have left to go."

Read the full article here.