As
the Israeli incursion into Gaza continues, I will be creating posts in this
series entitled “Notes on the Gaza Assault,” attempting to highlight some of
the primary issues we should all be concerned with as events continue to
develop. These may be a bit more free form and written a bit more “from the hip,”
so to speak, however I will do my best to keep providing sources for
information discussed.
a : the
inhibition of criminal behavior by fear
especially of punishment
b : the
maintenance of military power for the purpose of discouraging attack
ter·ror·ism noun \ˈter-ər-ˌi-zəm\
: the
systematic use of terror especially
as a means of coercion
The connotation of “deterrence”
in Israeli political discourse
In American discourse, deterrence is a
concept discussed in two conversations: “Capital punishment acts as a deterrent for criminals,” a statement
that more closely resembles definition (a); and “During the Cold War, the
build-up of America’s nuclear arsenal deterred
the Soviet Union from a direct confrontation with the United States,” a
statement more akin to definition (b). In Israeli discourse, however, the use
of the word ‘deterrence’ is quite different. Compared to all of Israel's potential regional threats, definition (b) is a joke; Israel has a vast “qualitative edge” over every other
power in the region—our Congress explicitly ensures this every time it passes a
bill regarding Israeli military aid—and that’s just considering the states, let
alone sub-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah.[2]
Problematically, this confines Israel’s
the use of “deterrence” as definition (a): “the inhibition of criminal behavior
by fear.” The conclusion to be drawn is that when a military operation takes
place that lists among its primary objectives as “restoring deterrence” we can
interpret this as an attempt discourage Israel’s potential enemies by shock and
awe inspiring shows of force, if not brutality. We might look briefly at Defense Minister Ehud
Barak’s objectives for operation Pillar of Cloud: “Strengthening our deterrence;
To inflict serious damage on the rocket launching network; To deliver a painful
blow for Hamas and the other terrorist organizations; To minimize damage to our
home front.”[3]
The second and third objectives have no doubt been achieved long before this point; the
last has been clearly demonstrated as a failure given the escalation in rocket
attacks that have resulted—for the first time in almost a year—the death of 3
Israeli citizens, and the most recent bus bombing in Tel Aviv that injured over
a dozen people.[4]
Thus, the deterrence objective is the only one that ostensibly remains within reach.
Many Israeli commentators and public
figures have made it clear what they feel will represent an effective show of
deterrence. Gilad Sharon, son of the (in)famous Israeli war criminal/Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon, argued in The
Jerusalem Post that Israel’s victory must be decisive explaining,
If it isn't clear whether the ball crossed the goal-line or not, the goal isn't decisive. The
ball needs to hit the net, visible to all… to accomplish this, you need to
achieve what the other side can’t bear, can’t live with, and out initial
bombing campaign isn't it…[5]
Further
explaining how deterrence works Sharon says,
We need to
flatten entire neighborhoods in Gaza. Flatten all of Gaza… There should be no
electricity in Gaza, no gasoline or moving vehicles, nothing. Then they’d
really call for a ceasefire. Were this to happen, the images from Gaza might be
unpleasant—but victory would be swift, and the lives our soldiers and civilians
would be spared.[6]
Grizzly as it may sound, these ideas are
not new to Israeli military history. Thomas rid tracks such a practice of
deterrence being employed by pre-Israeli Zionists during the British Mandate
period.[7] The
notion has a name widely used and discussed in Israeli military circles: the Dahiya doctrine. This doctrine is named
for a suburb of Beirut that was decimated during Israel’s war with Hezbollah in
2006. A Human Rights Watch report details the carnage:
In their attacks
on this largely Shi’a district of high-rise apartment buildings[Dahiya],
Israeli forces attacked not only Hezbollah military targets but also the
offices of Hezbollah’s charitable organizations, the offices of its parliamentarians,
its research center, and multi-story residential apartment buildings in areas
considered supportive of Hezbollah. Statements by Israeli officials strongly
suggest that the massive IDF attacks in southern Beirut were carried out…
because they were seen as pro-Hezbollah.[8]
It
should be noted that after dropping leaflets on the area warning residents to
leave, many did indeed evacuate, which resulted in few deaths in comparison
with the widespread destruction wreaked upon the suburb.
During a rather absurd media war between
Hezbollah and Israel in 2008, an Israeli Commander threatened to repeat Israel’s
performance in the future:
What happened in
the Dahiya quarter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in every village from which
Israel is fired on. We will apply disproportionate force on it and cause great
damage and destruction there. From our stand point, these are not villages,
they are military bases.[9]
Israeli
media personality Yaron London giddily praised these comments saying,
In the next
clash with Hizbullah, we won’t bother to hunt for tens of thousands of rocket
launchers and we won’t spill our soldiers’ blood in attempts to overtake
fortified Hizbullah positions. Rather, we shall destroy Lebanon and won’t be
deterred by the protest of the world. We
shall pulverize the 160 Shiite villages that have turned into Shiite army
bases, and we shall not show mercy when it comes to hitting the national
infrastructure of a state that, in practice, is controlled by Hizbullah. This
strategy is not a threat uttered by an impassioned officer, but rather, an
approved plan.[10]
The
key breakthrough, according to London, is that there are no innocents; there
are no civilians; “nations are responsible for their leaders' acts. In practical terms, the Palestinians in
Gaza are all Khaled Mashaal, the Lebanese are all Nasrallah, and the Iranians
are all Ahmadinejad.”[11]
This is the very same reasoning terrorist organizations use and London admits as
much albeit couched in more Orientalist (if not altogether racist) language. Hamas
and other militant groups argue the same point about all Israeli civilians
being responsible for the actions of their government and hence as targets they are
perfectly legitimate.
Looking at operation Cast Lead with four
years of hindsight might reveal more about the efficacy of Israel’s deterrence
capacity. According to the Goldstone Report, Israel targeted a wide variety of
civilian infrastructure for destruction including flour mills, chicken farms,
sewage treatment facilities, and large swaths of civilian housing.[12]
This is in addition to the 1400 Palestinians killed in the assault.[13]
The Palestinian Center for Human Rights claimed that about 236 Palestinians killed were combatants;[14] B’tselem,
an Israeli human rights agency, claimed that approximately 330-375 were
combatants;[15]
the Israeli army claimed that 709 were “Hamas terror operatives.”[16] Regardless
of which figures we believe it is perfectly clear that civilians suffered more
than militants. However, the civilians by definition are not the people launching
rocket attacks, and four years later there are still flare-ups in such attacks.
It seems to me that these Israeli operations tend to grant Hamas and other
militant groups only solidify support for Hamas, as they are frequently seen as
the only one standing up for the Palestinians in Gaza. It’s rather evident that
the Palestinian Authority (and the Fatah party that controls it) was powerless
to stop these assaults. While in short term benefits for Isreal, this means that Mahmoud Abbas will be weak as pushes ahead at the UN for non-member state status, but in the long-run a weakened Abbas will only serve to empower less pliable elements of the Palestinian political spectrum. However, it must be said that expecting a population to blame their own governors for the foreign
bombs landing on their home is sheer insanity.
The key difference between the
actions and calculus of Hamas and Israel is that terrorism as
practiced by Israel is meant to “deter” (re: punish) resistance to its policies
from those who are subject to their most brutal effects, while Hamas employs
terrorism as a form of resistance. Both deserve condemnation, but both deserve
this key qualification: one serves as a form of resistance and one serves as
form of crushing resistance. More honest journalists and analysts should call
Israel’s operations of deterrence for what they are: terrorism that
deliberately targets civilian infrastructure and civilian targets as a means of
coercing those civilians to reject and blame their own leadership for Israel’s
bullets and bombs.
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welcome.
[1]
All definitions taken from: http://www.merriam-webster.com/.
[2]
CRS report
[3] “Pillar
of Defense – Statement by DM Ehud Barak.”IsraeliMinistry of Foreign Affairs. 14
November 2012. Accessed 21 November 2012. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2012/Pillar_of_Defense-Statement_DM_Barak_14-Nov-2012.htm
[4] Sherwood,
Harriet. “Tel Aviv bus bombing raises fears in Israel that Gaza conflict will
spread.” The Guardian. 21 November
2012. Accessed 21 Novmeber 2012. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/21/tel-aviv-bus-bomb-gaza-spread
[5]
Sharon, Gilad. “A decisive conclusion is necessary.” The Jerusalem Post. 28 November 2012. Accessed 21 November 2012. http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?ID=292466
[6]
Ibid.
[7]
Rid, Thomas. “Deterrence beyond the State: The Israeli Experience.”
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.
33, No. 1. April 2012. Accessed 21 November 2012. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13523260.2012.659593
[8] “Why they Died.” Human Rights Watch. September 2007. Accessed 21 November 2012. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/lebanon0907.pdf.
Refuting the line the attacks were targeting Hezbollah munitions, but the group
was using human shields Human Rights Watch goes on, “In the 94 incidents involving
civilian casualties that Human Rights Watch investigated, we found evidence in
only one case involving civilian deaths that Hezbollah weapons were stored in
the building. Rather, it appears…that Hezbollah had stored most of its weapons
and ammunition, notably rockets, in bunkers and weapon storage facilities
located in the fields and the valleys surrounding villages.”
[9] Katz,
Yaakov. “The Dahiya Doctrine: Fighting dirty or a knock-out punch?” The Jerusalem Post. 28 January 2010.
Accessed 21 November 2012. http://www.jpost.com/Features/FrontLines/Article.aspx?id=167167
[10] London,
Yaron. “The Dahiya Strategy.” Yediot
Aharonot. 6 October 2008. Accessed 21 November 2012. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3605863,00.html
[11] Ibid.
[12] “Report
of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict.” United Nations
Report A/HRC/12/48. 25 September 2009. Accessed 13 November 2012. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf
[13] During
this same time period 13 Israelis lost their lives, of which 10 were soldiers,
of which 4 casualties was the result of friendly fire.
[14] Laub,
Karin. “Rights group names 1,417 Gaza war dead.” The Washington Times. 19 March 2009. Accessed 22 November 2012. http://www.webcitation.org/5niC4Iiub
[15] “B’Tselem’s
investigation of fatalities in Operation Cast Lead.” B’Tselem. September
2009. Accessed 22 November 2012. http://www.webcitation.org/5niCUh4K4
[16]
Lappin, Yaakov. “IDF releases Cast Lead casualty numbers.” The Jerusalem Post. 26 March 2009. Accessed 22 November 2012. http://www.webcitation.org/5niwZTV9K
