Muhammad
Morsi is a bad president. Let us allow a brief re-cap for the uninitiated:
Morsi has failed to protect Egypt’s minorities, including Shiites
and Christians;
under his administration, the economy has continued
to crumble with inflation rates ever out of control; crime is a persistent
problem as police and the interior ministry remain unsolvable Gordian knots beyond
the reach of reform; Morsi oversaw the ham-fisted imposition of a grossly inadequate
constitution; and who could forget in late 2012 when he infamously, albeit temporarily, made
himself pharaoh, placing himself beyond the reach of judicial oversight.
The tamarod (rebel) campaign, a grassroots
initiative circulating a petition of no confidence in Morsi and his administration,
had collected over 22 million signatures before mass protests erupted on June
30. This is devastating for his Freedom
and Justice Party (the Muslim Brotherhood's political party) considering that Morsi was only elected with about 13 million
votes.
On July 1 the
Egyptian military issued an ultimatum to Morsi in a televised statement, General Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, Egypt's Defense Minister, threatening that if Morsi fails
to solve the crisis the military will “be obliged by its patriotic and historic
responsibilities and by its respect for the demands of the great Egyptian
people to announce a roadmap for the future and the steps for overseeing its
implementation, with participation of all patriotic and sincere parties and
movements.” The announcement was met by raucous excitement, and military helicopters
trailing Egyptian flags flying over Tahrir square were met cheers. Many
activists have greeted the military’s threat with approval, including Mahmoud
Badr, a spokesman associated with the tamarod
campaign, saying that the ultimatum “crowns our movement.”
But if the
year of Egypt’s rule under the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) should
have taught Egyptians anything it is this: Beware of Egyptian generals bearing
gifts.
Now making a
comeback, the popular slogan “the people and the army are one hand” was wildly
popular after Hosni Mubarak’s departure on February 11, 2011. Indeed it was the
military’s refusal to participate in Mubarak’s oppression that led to his
eventual ouster. But it is tragically short-sighted to view the army as purely
expressing solidarity. The military has been the ultimate power in Egypt since
the 1952 officer’s rebellion, and after sixty years of rule they have gotten
use to their position of power, notoriously associated with corruption
funded in large part by US foreign aid.
Activists in
Egypt need to understand that the ultimate political power in Egypt is and has
always been the military. Mubarak was the face of this power and the military
supported him until continued support became impossible. A year of SCAF rule
made it clear that the military powers did not have much interest in governing
so much as they did in finding ways of maintaining their power and privilege.
Under SCAF's leadership, Egypt’s activists witnessed numerous violent encounters with the
state, including the Battle of Muhammad Mahmoud Street, and the Maspero
massacre, to name but a few. Moreover, Morsi’s economic perils, though they
certainly accelerated during his administration, were nevertheless crises
continued from the period of SCAF rule. Moreover, while Morsi and the military
bosses did not see eye to eye on many issues, it is apparent that they had a modus
vivendi not the least of which included special provisions in Morsi’s
constitution that safeguarded that privileged status, including military trials
for civilians.
It is obvious
that Egyptians have had enough of Morsi, and it would be mad to demand
Egyptians to put up with his ineptitude for another three years. However, arguing
that Morsi must step down and that civilian rule must, even temporarily, be
swept away by the military and for the military is no solution at all. The
premise that the military is a sufficient institution for the transition to
democracy is evidentially false. The SCAF model readily demonstrated this absurdity.
The military is not the answer to the problem; the military is the underlying,
ultimate problem, the key obstacle to be overcome if Egypt is to ever find
stability and its citizens find the freedom and dignity that they currently
demand.
The solution
in the short term is obviously Morsi’s resignation followed by elections, but
the long term goal for Egyptians must be the reigning in of military privilege
and power that has gone too long unchecked.
