'None of your governments would accept such a situation.'

The government of Israel and Hamas are once again acting like children. With the eyes of the world looking over with disdain and some irritation, members sympathetic to or affiliated with both parties are shouting “They started it!”[1] At the mention of a ceasefire, representatives of both Israel and Hamas indignantly sneer, “You stop it!” “No, you stop it!”[2] Unlike a schoolyard fight, however, one of the participants is the western supplied, funded, and supported government of Israel, and the other is a choked, impoverished, and condemned Gaza Strip. Also unlike a schoolyard fight, the cost of continued escalation between Israel and Hamas will be measured in human lives.

There is very little point, as far as I can tell, in detailing when the latest exchange of violence between the Israeli army and the conglomeration of militant groups in Gaza began. Whether it began over this past weekend or perhaps weeks earlier in October, the enmity and hostility between the two parties has persisted for years and the therein lies the real story, rather than the recently reached boiling point.

Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu recently gathered 50 Ambassadors in Ashkelon (within range of rocket attacks) in order to head off any criticism of Israel’s actions against Gaza. “We will not sit idly,” he told them, “in front of recurrent attacks that occur almost daily, against our citizens and our children. More than one million citizens have to live in a reality where within 15 or 30 seconds they need to find shelter against terrorists who shoot at civilians, while the terrorists themselves hide behind civilians… None of your governments would accept such a situation.”[3]

This is certainly true. Indiscriminate rocket attacks fired at civilian populations in southern Israel are absolutely worthy of condemnation, and there is no government that would find them tolerable.  However, this is only half the story. Any envoys that visited Gaza (however unlikely such a trip may be) might be treated to a similar speech from Ismail Haniyeh, the former Prime Minister of the Palestine Legislative Council (PLC).

He might tell envoys that no country would tolerate the foreign support for the overthrow of its democratically elected government. This is precisely what happened in 2007, though it is still commonly referred to as a Hamas coup d'etat.[4] Following Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006, Israel announced that it would stop transferring tax revenues to the Palestinian Authority (PA).[5] The Quartet (the United States, the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia), rather than condemn Israel’s meddling in the democratic affairs of the occupied territories, immediately did the same, suspending all aid previously pledged to the PA.[6] PA President Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah acted immediately to strip the PLC of its parliamentary powers, consolidating them under the office of the President.[7] Hamas representatives called this an attempted “white coup d’etat;” the red coup d’etat was not far off.[8] The United States moved weapons (with the assistance of the governments of Israel and Egypt) to the Fatah spy master/thug in Gaza Mohammed Dahlan.[9] His bloody 2007 attempt at overthrowing Hamas in Gaza was a failure, and Hamas subsequently ousted Fatah members from the Gaza Strip (others were killed outright) resulting in the current political bifurcation of the occupied territory.[10]

Haniyeh might tell visiting dignitaries about the disturbing blockade that Gazans are confronted with and have been confronted with since Israel’s 2005 “disengagement” from Gaza that was intensified following the democratic election of Hamas in 2006 and the 2007 split between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The blockade is specifically calculated to bring Gaza to the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe though without pushing it over. These calculations are measured down to the amount of calories each Gazan needs to avoid starvation.[11] Israel’s efforts to prevent such a disaster are not entirely successful however. Approximately 61% of Gazan households remain food insecure which in no small part has resulted in serious consequences for the next generation of Gazans.[12] For example 15% of children in Gaza are stunted from malnutrition and 76% of Palestinian infants are anemic.[13]

Haniyeh might tell envoys that no country would tolerate, in Israel’s words, “economic warfare” being waged upon their populace.[14] Israel, in spite of the disengagement, maintains sovereignty over Gaza’s airspace, coastal waters, and borders. It allows few exports, and no more imports than required to prevent a famine. One Op-Ed in The Jerusalem Post cited letters the writer had sent to Hamas leaders one which extolled them to “focus on building rather than destroying.”[15] If only it were so simple. During the December-January 2008-2009 Israeli incursion into Gaza (the likes of which are being considered now[16]) Israel was indisputably focused on destruction. According to the Goldstone Report*, Israel targeted a wide variety of civilian infrastructure for destruction including flour mills, chicken farms, sewage treatment facilities, and large swaths of civilian housing.[17] This is in addition to the 1400 Gazans killed in the assault.[18] Until June of 2010, Israel barred the entrance of concrete into Gaza so reconstruction and repair were out of the question. Since this relaxation, there has indeed emerged a burgeoning construction sector.[19] However this sector still relies on the black market tunnel economy to supply it with enough raw materials still restricted (and some barred completely) by Israel’s blockade.

Haniyeh might exclaim to visiting ambassadors about Israel (as Israel’s advocates would exclaim about Hamas) that they do not abide by ceasefires, that they cannot be negotiated with. Even now Israeli officials are making threats (threats with plans behind them) about the possibility of another ground assault or perhaps a more rigorous campaign of aerial bombardment while refusing to enter into negotiations or direct talks with the Hamas government in Gaza.[20] Hamas has indicated they would be willing to enter into negotiations and that they would support a two state solution (though not without some rhetorical/ideological schizophrenia).[21] However, Israel refuses to enter into negotiations with Hamas without a specific precondition: that Hamas recognize Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state. Hamas refuses to do so explicitly. There is ample room for discussion about either side’s willingness to negotiate and coexist, but the fact remains that Hamas and other militant groups have signaled they are willing to resume the previous ceasefire and it is the Israeli government that is discussing deterrence as if it is the only option available to them.

In the context of military occupation, historic and contemporary dispossession, admitted “economic warfare,” continued military excursions, and general misery and terror created in Gaza, it doesn't matter how the latest conflagration began. This recent surge in violence is merely a symptom of an underlying condition. Any ceasefire reached (God willing) soon will be nothing more than a temporary remedy that will require more serious introspection about the fundamental relationship between the government of Israel and the people that live in the shadow of its mercy. Gaza may not be a country, but we must understand that the people of Gaza cannot be expected to tolerate the conditions imposed upon them by Israel: there are no other peoples among the nations from whom anyone in their right mind would make such a demand. Moreover while both sides are responsible in one way or another for the boisterous reactionary violence that terrorizes Israeli citizens in Ashkelon and stateless citizens in Gaza, the status quo—unequivocally, objectively—has been created and is sustained by decisions made and policies carried out by the government of Israel.

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[1]  “Netanyahu promises IDF will act ‘forcefully’ in response to rocket attacks.” The Times of Israel. 11 November 2012. Accessed 13 November 2012. http://www.timesofisrael.com/ministers-threaten-to-up-the-ante-including-targeted-killings-in-response-to-rocket-fire/ Glaser, John. “Israel’s Latest Assault on Gaza: The Lie of Who Started It.” Antiwar. 11 November 2012. Accessed 13 November 2012. http://antiwar.com/blog/2012/11/11/israels-latest-assault-on-gaza-the-lie-of-who-started-it/

[2] “Israel warns Hamas of ‘heavy price’ for Gaza rockets.” Mail & Guardian. 12 November 2012. Accessed 13 November 2012. http://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-12-israel-warns-hamas-of-heavy-price-for-gaza-rockets. “Israel launches fresh strikes on Gaza.” Al Jazeera. 13 November 2012. Accessed on 13 November 2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/11/20121112205723641623.html

[3] Ahren, Raphael. Davidovich, Joshua. “Your government would not tolerate a situation like this, PM tells enoys as fire pounds south.” The Times of Israel. 12 November 2012. Accessed 13 November 2012. http://www.timesofisrael.com/rocket-fire-continues-to-pound-south-as-pm-defends-israels-right-to-respond/

[4] Issacharoff, Avi. “Hamas leader lauds visiting Qatar emir for ‘breaking’ Gaza blockade.” Haaretz. 23 October 2012. Accessed 13 November 2012. http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/hamas-leader-lauds-visiting-qatar-emir-for-breaking-gaza-blockade-1.471765

[5] Lavie, Mark. “Hamas facing severe tests even before it takes over Palestinian government.” The Associated Press. 29 January 2006.

[6] Knudsen, Are. Basem, Ezbidi. "Hamas and Palestinian Statehood." Where Now for Palestine?: the Demise of the Two-state Solution. Ed. Jamil Hilal. (London: Zed, 2007) 188-209.

[7] Laub, Karin. “Abbas consolidating powers to make it harder for Hamas to rule.” The Associated Press. 14 Februay 2006.

[8] Nissenbaum, Dion. “Abbas given new powers.” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. 14 February 2006.

[9] Harel, Amos, and Avi Issacharoff. "Israeli Defense Official: Fatah Arms Transfer Bolsters Forces of Peace." Haaretz. 28 Dec. 2006.

[10] Rose, David. “The Gaza Bomb Shell.” Vanity Fair. 2008 April. Accessed 13 November 2012. http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/gaza200804. Leupp, Gary. “A Hamas Coup d’Etat in 2007?” Counterpunch. 6 January 2009. Accessed 13 November 2012. http://www.counterpunch.org/2009/01/06/a-hamas-coup-d-etat-in-2007/.

[11] Seikaly, Sherene. “Counting calories and making lemonade in Gaza.” Egypt Independent. 12 November 2012. Accessed 13 November 2012. http://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/counting-calories-and-making-lemonade-gaza

[12] Cole, Juan. “Israel’s Strangulation of Gaza by the Numbers.” Informed Comment. 5 November 2011. Accessed 13 November 2012. http://www.juancole.com/2011/11/israels-strangulation-of-gaza-by-the-numbers.html. The link used here contains information derived from the United Nations and the National Center for Biotechnology Information, among others. Professor Cole provides links to these publications on his website.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Frenkel, Sheera. “Israeli document: Gaza blockade isn’t about security.” McClatchy. 9 June 2010. Accessed 13 November 2012. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/06/09/95621/israeli-document-gaza-blockade.html

[15] Baskin, Gershon. “Ecountering Peace: Message to Hamas, Israel leaders.” The Jerusalem Post. 12 November 2012. Accessed 13 November 2012. http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=291533

[16] Ginsburg, Mitch. “The approach of an unwanted war in Gaza.” The Times of Israel. 11 November 2012. Accessed 13 November 2012. http://www.timesofisrael.com/the-approach-of-an-unwanted-war-in-gaza/

** While Richard Goldstone, the former judge who headed the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, has since recanted some of the mission’s conclusions, the findings detailed meticulously throughout the report have not been discredited. Moreover, the other authors of the report disagreed with Goldstone’s retraction.

[17] “Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict.” United Nations Report A/HRC/12/48. 25 September 2009. Accessed 13 November 2012. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf

[18] During this same time period 13 Israelis lost their lives, of which 10 were soldiers, of which 4 casualties was the result of friendly fire.

[19] “Construction sector booms in Gaza.” Al Jazeera. 13 July 2012. Accessed 13 November 2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/video/middleeast/2012/07/2012713112137195857.html

[20] “Netanyahu promises IDF will act ‘forcefully’ in response to rocket attacks.” The Times of Israel. 11 November 2012. Accessed 13 November 2012. http://www.timesofisrael.com/ministers-threaten-to-up-the-ante-including-targeted-killings-in-response-to-rocket-fire/

[21] Mccarthy, Rory. “We can accept Israel as neighbor, says Hamas.” Guardian. 21 April 2008. Accessed 9 November 2012. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/21/israel. Hass, Amira. “Haniyeh: Hamas willing to accept Palestinian state with 1967 borders.” Haaretz. 9 November 2008. Accessed 9 November 2012. http://www.haaretz.com/news/haniyeh-hamas-willing-to-accept-palestinian-state-with-1967-borders-1.256915.  Waked, Ali. “Mashaal: Hamas willing to accept peace deal with Israel.” Yedioth Ahronot. 20 October 2010. Accessed 9 November 2012. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3972646,00.html

Critically Assessing Dershowitz's Latest Comments on the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process

The peace process between the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships has lain dormant and dysfunctional for years now, but Professor Alan Dershowitz, a staunch supporter of Israel, has recently proposed a plan meant to break the deadlock between the two parties.[1] Dershowitz’s plan to resume negotiations, however, is rife with Israeli advantages that play into the current weaknesses of the Palestinian leadership. Palestinian negotiators have demanded that Israel halt all settlement activities before they will once again return to the negotiating table. Conversely, Israel rejects any preconditions to negotiations and refuses to halt the continued expansion of what are recognized around the world as illegal settlements.[2]

Thus Dershowitz has a plan that proposes that negotiations begin without preconditions, as the current Israeli government demands, where the two parties will immediately agree on the status of three types of areas: in the first type of area, Dershowitz explains, are areas that everyone knows will be a part of Palestine (main urban centers like Ramallah and Jericho that are populated exclusively by Palestinians) where illegal Israeli construction will stop; in the second type, areas that “will definitely remain part of Israel after any peace agreement,” (which Dershowitz identifies explicitly as “areas contiguous to greater Jerusalem”) construction will continue; finally, in all other areas that remain, using Dershowitz’s jargon, “disputed” there will be a temporary freeze of illegal Israeli construction.  Only days ago, these “disputed” areas were among the sites that Netanyahu announced a further expansion of settlements, though the lion’s share of these new illegal structures are targeted at East Jerusalem, further galvanizing Israel’s claim to “greater Jerusalem” (re: an undivided, Israeli Jerusalem).[3] Dershowitz explains that at the end of this process, both sides will get what they want, a resumption of negotiations and a freeze in settlements.

However there are several problems with this plan, a plan that Mahmoud Abbas has apparently already agreed to. The most glaring of these problems is that it pre-empts the status of Jerusalem, once an issue deferred to final status talks that would now be conceded by Palestinians to Israel’s successful—albeit criminal—campaign of expansion. Moreover the “freeze” of illegal settlement construction elsewhere in the occupied Palestinian territories is offered as a prize to Palestinians rather than the proper, legal course of action that it ought to be for the government of Israel.

That under this framework negotiations begin with a Palestinian concession is a fairly clear signal: Israel expects more concessions and is ready impose more still. Dershowitz went on to suggest that the resumption of negotiations was the only remaining obstacle, explaining that “Everyone knows what a negotiated peace would look like.” Dershowitz describes the apparently self-evident conclusion to the long, tortuous peace process with several points whose sum amount to a troublesome future for any Palestinian state:

1. The borders will be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed upon land swaps. Dershowitz however fails to complicate just how “mutual” any such agreement may be, given the fragile nature of Abbas’ legitimacy. Abbas was due for re-election in January 2009, but the elections were postponed indefinitely, ostensibly due to the schism between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In any event, Dershowitz’s previous criteria that divide occupied Palestine by its relationship to Israel’s expansionist goals have transgressed the 1967 lines resulting in a de-facto annexation of Jerusalem.
2. Palestine will exist as a “demilitarized” state. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s vision of this concept was spelled out in a speech he gave from Bar-Ilan University in 2009. Netanyahu elaborated, saying that this meant that Palestine would have no control of airspace, no right to make treaties with other nations, and no right to form and maintain army. The first stipulation seems like quite a breach of sovereignty, though one that is relatively minor in comparison with the following two tenets of “demilitarization” that leaves Palestine implicitly dependent on Israel for continued security and protection.
3. Israel will retain a military presence in the Jordan Valley. This is another point of contention that has recently manifested earlier this year during talks hosted by King Abdullah in Jordan. Israeli officials have for years claimed that a permanent presence in the Jordan Valley was necessary to protect Israel, however Israeli negotiator Isaac Molho explained that Israel was now seeking a long-term presence.[4] Since Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967, Israel has built not just military bases in the Jordan Valley, but also illegal civilian settlements. In Al Aqaba alone the population has been reduced from approximately 2000 inhabitants in 1967 to less than 300 today.[5] To this day, the Israeli army carries out demolition orders on civilian structures from tents to water containers, claiming that such structures are built without the proper permits, though the permits remain difficult to obtain. The status of the Jordan Valley has additional effects on the remainder of the West Bank however. Due to the presence of military installations and illegal settlements, there are numerous Israeli-only roads that cut across the West Bank that Palestinians have no access to. This means that the Palestinians are forced to accept infrastructure in their areas that they are forbidden from using, while they are resigned to building new infrastructure to circumvent the Israeli-only network. Additionally the Jordan Valley holds large amounts of water resources that the Oxfam International estimates could generate an additional $1 billion per annum for the Palestinian economy.[6] As of today, most of these resources go to Israel and to Israeli settlements.
4. There will be a “realistic resolution of the Jerusalem issue.” We can only infer from Dershowitz’s proposal that East Jerusalem would be remain under Israel’s sovereignty. The illegal settlements that surround East Jerusalem, according to Dershowitz, belong to Israel and the Palestinians should simply accept this. This amounts to a demand that Palestinians accept Israel’s expansionism and colonialism as legitimate, and discard the reality that Israel’s settlements anywhere beyond the green line, including in East Jerusalem, are illegal. However, we may return to Abbas and the Palestinian negotiators concessions that have already been issued with regard to Jerusalem. During the 2009 talks, as revealed by the Palestine Papers, the Palestinian leadership offered Israel all of Jerusalem—much to the ire of the Palestinian population—save for Abu Dis, a heavily populated Palestinian neighborhood.[7] This offer was rejected by the Israeli negotiators as well as the supposedly neutral mediator of Condoleezza Rice, who, confronted with Palestinian firmness on the neighborhood of Abu Dis, replied, “Then you won’t have a state!” A “realistic resolution of the Jerusalem issue” ought to be reasonable as well. Israel’s negotiators historically have obstinately refused the idea of dividing Jerusalem, even in the face of drastic and unpopular concessions on the part of the Palestinian leadership. Dershowitz’s proposal for the start of negotiations (as well as the subsequent forecast to their end) only serves to reinforce this stubbornness
5. Palestinians will abandon what Dershowitz dismisses as “the so-called Right of Return.” Just last week Abbas hinted that the Right of Return was being drastically revised by the Palestinian leadership—again to the consternation of the Palestinian population, both in the territories as well as abroad in refugee camps and elsewhere. However, due to popular dissatisfaction Abbas quickly backtracked on the comments.[8] In any event, the right of return, according to Human Rights Watch, is an individual right, not a collective right that can be conceded by any one leader.[9] The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research conducted a poll in 2003 that suggested that the overwhelming majority of Palestinian refugees would prefer to remain in either a newly created Palestinian state or their current country of residence.[10] However, it is still imperative that Israel (and apparently Abbas) recognize the Right of Return, as those who do not wish to return to Israel are still entitled to compensation. This compensation would be costly (estimated at approximately $100 billion, funded by the international community), but as David Gardner writes, this sum “will prove a lot cheaper than the alternative: a beleaguered Israel ringed by dozens of camps, desperate huddles of misery so cut off from any hope of a decent future they will become the new universities of Jihad. No Israeli wall will be proof against that.”[11] In short, the price of peace will inevitably be cheaper than the cost of continued violent confrontation and enmity.
6. Finally, Gaza will be discarded as a lost cause in any negotiations. This is, perhaps, one of the more egregious of Dershowitz’s profanities. The situation in Gaza was rapidly deteriorating following the blockade on the tiny strip of land (approximately 2% of historic Palestine) after Hamas’s 2006 electoral victory, and the situation became dire following Hamas’ successful defense against Fatah’s disastrous 2007 attempted coup. The destruction visited upon Gaza’s civilian infrastructure during the December-January 2008-2009 Israeli assault resulted in what was largely recognized (though not by the American or Israeli governments) as a humanitarian catastrophe. Following a recent visit to Gaza by famed public intellectual Noam Chomsky, he described the situation with language similar to others, declaring that Gaza is “the world’s largest open-air prison.”[12] Israel has met any attempts at a political reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas with predictable threats, thus preventing real progress on ameliorating the situation in Gaza. Under such conditions no reasonable, informed mind can think that Hamas will be made more likely to cooperate and submit to Israeli power. Dershowitz implies that unless Hamas recognizes “Israel’s right to exist,” the situation in there will remain the status quo, but while Hamas has a history of obfuscating this demand there is an opportunity for negotiations and diplomacy to resolve this issue. The militant group has insisted in the past that it would accept a two-state solution in which recognition is implicit, while at other times Hamas leaders have refused to admit this fact.[13] Nevertheless, Hamas has demonstrated that it is willing to be a part of negotiations and end violent actions toward Israel, albeit with certain—not unreasonable—conditions. In the face of such an opportunity, Hamas’ cognitive dissonance between embracing a two-state solution and refusing to recognitze Israel is entirely irrelevant. However, if such an outcome is to be realized, the collective punishment visited upon the Gaza Strip will have to end, and democratic, free, unhindered elections will have to return to the occupied territories to establish a national consensus and a legitimate forum of leadership. The issue of Gaza is absolutely critical to moving ahead with the peace process. No party can afford to move ahead while Gaza moves closer and closer toward oblivion.

Dershowitz’s proposal for negotiations is more accurately described as the Palestinian leadership’s most recent invitation to hear Israel’s demands. Under Dershowitz’s framework and subsequent prognostication, future negotiations appear more as a forum for Palestinian concession, not negotiation. Anyone who truly wants to move the peace process forward must accept that the issues are more complex—and in some instances, more dire—than Dershowitz has thus shown fit to treat them.

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[1] Dershowitz, Alan M. “Following the elections, Mideast peace negotiations should resume.” Gatestone Institute. 3 November 2012. Accessed 8 November 2012. http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3432/mideast-peace-negotiations

[2] “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.” International Court of Justice. Press Release 2004/28. Accessed 9 November 2012 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pr=71&code=mwp&p1=3&p2=4&p3=6&ca

[3] Horowitz, Adam. “Netanyahu on election eve: Approves 1,200 new settlement homes while promising Israel won’t wait for US to attack Iran.” Mondoweiss. 6 November 2012. Accessed 9 November 2012. http://mondoweiss.net/2012/11/netanyahu-on-election-eve-approves-1200-new-settlement-homes-while-promising-israel-wont-wait-for-us-to-attack-iran.html

[4] Hatuqa, Dalia. “Israel restricts Jordan Valley water access.” Al Jazeera. 28 July 2012. Accessed 8 November 2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/07/20127259518330800.html.

[5] Ibid.

[6] “On The Brink: Israeli settlements and their impact on Palestinians in the Jordan Valley.” Oxfam International. 5 July 2012. Accessed 8 November 2012. http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp160-jordan-valley-settlements-050712-en_1.pdf

[7] Carlstrom, Gregg. “The Palestine Papers: “The biggest Yerushalayim.”” Al Jazeera. 23 January 2011. Accessed 8 November 2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/palestinepapers/2011/01/2011122112512844113.html

[8] “Abbas ‘refugee’ comments wow Israel, enrage Gaza.” Ahram Online. 4 November 2012. Accessed 9 November 2012. http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/57111.aspx

[9] “Human Rights Watch Policy on the Right of Return.” Human Rights Watch. Accessed 8 November 2012. http://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/israel/return/

[10] “Results of PSR Refugees’ Polls in the West Bank/Gaza Strip, Jordan and Lebanon on Refugee’s Preferences and Behavior in a Palestinian-Israeli Permanent Refugee Agreement.” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. 18 July 2003. Accessed 8 November 2012. http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/refugeesjune03.html

[11] Gardner, David. “Israel-Palestine: solving the refugee question.” OpenDemocracy. 18 August 2009. Accessed 8 November 2012. http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/israel-palestine-solving-the-refugee-question

[12] Chomsky, Noam. “Gaza, The World’s Largest Open-Air Prison.” In These Times. 7 November 2012. Accessed 9 November 2012. http://inthesetimes.com/article/14148/gaza_the_worlds_largest_open_air_prison

[13] Mccarthy, Rory. “We can accept Israel as neighbor, says Hamas.” Guardian. 21 April 2008. Accessed 9 November 2012. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/21/israel. Hass, Amira. “Haniyeh: Hamas willing to accept Palestinian state with 1967 borders.” Haaretz. 9 November 2008. Accessed 9 November 2012. http://www.haaretz.com/news/haniyeh-hamas-willing-to-accept-palestinian-state-with-1967-borders-1.256915.  Waked, Ali. “Mashaal: Hamas willing to accept peace deal with Israel.” Yedioth Ahronot. 20 October 2010. Accessed 9 November 2012. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3972646,00.html

Breaking Down the Diplomatic Impasse on Syria

To bring down Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, it took seventeen days and it cost the Egyptian people 846 lives. The Syrian uprising began on March 15 2011 with peaceful protests in the city of Deraa,’ though Bashar Al-Assad was able to successfully turn those nonviolent protests (characteristic of the other Arab uprisings) into what observers have begun to call a civil war. At this time, 562 days have passed with an more than 26,000 Syrians dead. An estimated 5,400 were killed in August 2012 alone.

There has been some talk about the possibility of a Libya-style intervention in order to support the Syrian rebels. However, there are significant differences between the situation in Libya then and the situation in Syria now. First of all, Libya has a significant amount of oil which was vital to Italy’s economic stability, and since the overthrow of Qaddafi, western oil companies have already moved in or returned in order to pick up the pieces. Syria has no oil, and there are no European or western economies that depend on a stable Syria. Additionally, the Libyan intervention had the support of the United Nations Security Council. All attempts at even condemning the deteriorating situation in Syria have been met with Russian and Chinese vetoes, whereas for the vote on the intervention in Libya they only abstained.

Even after the grisly month of August, there does not appear to be any change in position from these countries to support action in Syria, whether that means further sanctions or military interventions. What do these countries have to gain by financially, militarily, and diplomatically supporting Assad’s brutality?

Russia has several interests in Syria, most of which having to do with arms sales that amount to about $700 million per year to Assad’s regime. These arms deals have included most recently surface to air missiles (a not so subtle nod to Libya’s no-fly zone), armored rocket complexes and possibly even fighter jets. Arms deals are lasting connections; they do not end with an immediate transaction. An arms deal often requires years of training, maintenance and additional sales of ammunition. There are also several connections forged between the two countries that date back to the Cold War Era. First and foremost Syria has the last remaining Russian military base outside of its borders: the naval base in Tartus. However to a certain extent there is a deeper connection. During the Cold War era Syrian elites would often end up going to Russia for higher education and many as it turns out brought back a husband or a wife. As a result, there are approximately 30,000 Russian citizens living in Syria.

Russian diplomats have argued that if it is appropriate for Gulf countries and western powers to provide arms and support to the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian National Council, then why is Russia being criticized for supporting the regime? As empty as the argument may be, it is one that the US quietly understands. The US supported the Saudi Arabian intervention in Bahrain to crush the uprising there. Why would the US support the brutality in Bahrain? Well, it would likely come down to arms deals and the US naval base there (in addition to keeping oil markets stable, of course).

China claims that its interests in Syria do not go further than its relationship with Russia. Others have claimed that China’s foreign policy is based on a traditional view of international relations that demagogues the notion of sovereignty, apparently to the point of turning a blind eye to a bloodbath. However, China has not been neutral. They’ve vetoed the three Security Council attempts to punish the Assad regime, and have at the very least facilitated the transfer of arms from North Korea that was on route to Latakia before it was seized.

Iran, the regional rival of the governments aligned against Syria, has been actively supporting Assad’s regime with logistical and economic support as well as the presence of the Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force. Iran’s interests in standing by the Assad regime are two-fold: 1) Syria remains Iran’s access to the Mediterranean and the Levant and is a crucial component of facilitating material and military support to Hezbollah in Lebanon; and 2) Syria is a government dominated by Shia that is currently facing down a rebellion that is being supported by the Sunni-dominated Gulf states. While Bahrain’s Sunni minority crushes the resistance of the Shia majority (with US support), Iran is supporting the Syrian regime—dominated by the Shia minority—in their repression of Syria’s Sunni majority. There is no question that Iran would be regionally weaker without its long term Syrian ally. Iran is especially weary of this loss in the face of the recent turmoil surrounding its nuclear program and the western threats of military attack that have gone along with it.

One predominant problem facing a real policy shift for these countries is that the chips are already down so to speak. Even if Russia and Iran were to cut off aid to the Assad regime today and a new government was to emerge, this government would naturally carry quite a bit of resentment for the countries that armed and protected Assad’s terrorist government. The policy of support for dictators is inevitably counterintuitive particularly when it comes to forging long lasting geopolitical partnerships.

These are the diplomatic impasses that are stymieing further action in Syria. As the new UN envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi has said, this going to take an international effort in order to achieve the quick end to the bloodshed. This does not just mean America and its regional allies. If the western powers (including the US) are serious about really ending support for the Assad regime, they will need to engage with all parties. This includes China and Russia, but this also includes engaging Iran which, unfortunately the west has been reluctant to do at any time, on any issue.

Moreover it is necessary to complicate the western military support for the Syrian opposition. As much as I might favor nonviolence I do not favor at all suicide by dictator, which leaves in a default position of supporting the armed rebels. However, we should be mindful that the opposition and the rebels are not homogenous. There are fighters being backed by the specific parties of the Syrian National Council, others backed by specific Gulf countries, and while each is interested in the fall of the Assad regime, not all are committed to a military resolution and not all are committed to a free and democratic Syria. What is more is that choosing specific groups with interests that do not coincide with the interests of the Syrian people is wholly immoral. Rather than a chance to advance any particular party’s geopolitical interests all polities should be concerned with safety of the Syrian population. Syria is not a piece on a chessboard; it is a country with real issues with real people in real danger. All parties—America, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, etc.—ought to respect that.

Remembering the Syria of Yesterday

The first thing I noticed in Syria was Bashar al-Assad. This guy was everywhere. There was simply no doubt who was in control, and who was in power. You’d see his picture in the kiosks of street vendors, in the windows of bus stations, plastered on the backs of cars, posted over the gates of mosques. I saw Assad stretched four stories tall and draped across the front of buildings; I even saw his picture in the men’s restroom (in the corner of a mirror, rather than the bottom of a urinal). This was spring 2010, one year before the country would begin turning into a warzone. While I was there I actually witnessed a protest of sorts. My friends and I were walking along the streets in Damascus when perhaps fifteen young men wandered into a roundabout with picket signs—they were pro-Assad demonstrators hired by the government to protest… traffic, I suppose.

Beyond the absurdity that was the constant reminder Assad’s narcissism, the trip was amazing. I met some of the friendliest people I’ve met anywhere in the world in Syria.

In Hama, the group I was with met a few young men that wanted us join them while they sang songs in a public park (I get the feeling they were interested in the girls I was with). We talked—not about politics, not in public—and they sang songs in Arabic, before they asked us to sing a song for them. I’m not much of a singer and I’m also a bit shy so I wasn’t keen on joining in when one of the girls I was with started singing “Don’t Stop Believing” by Journey. It seemed ridiculous for a moment, but then the young men joined in knowing… most of the words I suppose.

I woke up early one morning in Homs and walked into the main reception area.  I say ‘main reception area’ when what I really mean is the hostel owner’s living room. He offered me coffee, and even though I declined he brought me a cup anyway. I was soon followed in by the owner’s young child who turned on the TV to watch the same Batman cartoon that I grew up with.

Our last day there we were wandered around the Khan As'ad Pasha, a historic market that's now popular tourist trap near Ummayyad Mosque. The friends I was with were interested in getting a souvenir that involved colored sand in glass bottles. I distinctly heard a sound I was not expecting to hear in Damascus: Dimmu Borgir, a fairly intense metal band, was blaring out of one of the nearby stores. I followed the sound into a store that sold tacky little necklaces to tourists and the store clerk quickly reached out to turn the volume dial to off on his CD player. The store clerk was heavy set, likely in his late 40s and was wearing blue jean shorts and a polo shirt. His appearance didn’t exactly scream ‘head banger.’ He began going through the usual store clerk greeting when I changed the subject to Dimmu Borgir. He laughed and explained that he used to be in his own death metal band, one of the few that have apparently ever existed in Syria.

I had done a research paper in the past about the metal scene in Iran, so I was curious about how it might compare. I asked if he ever had ever encountered any problems being in a metal band.

He shifted uncomfortably. “Of course,” he said.

I replied, “From the government? There are laws?”

He seemed to size me up for a minute and looked around. This isn’t the kind of conversation you would have comfortably in public, not with Assad’s secret police permeating the country. “Yes, from the government,” he answered. He explained that his band’s lyrics had to be approved by a government censor if they were going to distribute it on CDs. Not only that, but there were only three clubs in all of Syria where his band could play. The clubs had to have special permits and so did each band that played. At these clubs, the shows were even regulated. The fans, he explained, were required to remain seated.

In my head I conjured an image of every other metal club I’ve been in, dingy and a bit dark, with a long haired black-clad band screaming their heads off and pushing their amps beyond their capacity to make a reasonable sound; I imagined similarly black-clad fans with ridiculous makeup… seated motionless and quiet in their fold-out chairs. It was the single most depressing image I may have ever put in my own head.

I didn’t really know what to say. “That’s terrible, man,” I said. Impotent as it was, it was the best I could come up with.

He didn’t seem angry or bitter.  He just shrugged, his eyes heavy with fatigue. “It’s fucked. In Syria, you’re not allowed to be yourself.”

A local woman wearing hijab walked into his store and he began with his typical store clerk greeting, this time in Arabic. He gave me half a smile and a nod, and I left.

I have no way of knowing what became of any of them. The rockstar in Damascus, if he has stayed put and kept his head down, could be perfectly safe. Damascus has been hit with a few bombings, but largely the regime is still strong there and the city has escaped the worst of the violence. The singers in Hama however, I do truly fear for.  Hama was the site of Hafez al-Assad’s wrath back in 1982 when over 10,000 people died under the crush and thunder of artillery and bombs. The city hasn't faired much better as Hafez's son confronts the current uprising. Perhaps the worst has come to fruition or perhaps they are far away in Jordan or Turkey as a refugee. There’s simply no way to know.

When I see reports from Syria in my newsfeed, I feel a mix of emotions. The sadness in me simply wants them all to be safe; the anger—to my shame—wishes for them to fight Assad’s terrible regime and have vengeance for the more than 25,000 that have perished under the Assad regimes forces; but really what I want most is for that rockstar in Damascus to have found something to feel hope for, that though things maybe more horrific and horrible now than they’ve ever been, his country’s future is more malleable now than it’s been in decades.

There is reason to despair and reason to be afraid, but this is nothing new for Syrians. What is new, is that while for the past year Syria's present has been more dark and bloody than most can remember and Syria's future is completely uncertain, there is hope in that uncertainty; today there is hope for a free Syria tomorrow.

The Crime Of Introspection

About Last Week…

In the past week it has become increasingly clear that the protests are about more than simply an amateur hate film produced by a collection of bigots. There is a latent anti-Western sentiment that persists in the Middle East, regardless of the events of the Arab Spring. This sentiment is important and bears some serious investigation and discussion that I currently have yet to encounter on any popular media outlet.

MSNBC’s Joe Scarborough explained the recent images coming out of the Middle East to his viewers this morning, “You know why they hate us? I’ve been talking to intelligence people all weekend and you know what they said? They hate us because of their religion. They hate us because of their culture and because of peer pressure.” He went on to re-emphasize the point with an academic eloquence and wisdom, “They hate us because they hate us.”

Much has been made of America’s ostensible sainthood in the region in the face of “ungrateful” Arabs. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton responding to the death of Ambassador Chris Stevens said, “Today, many Americans are asking—indeed, I asked myself—how could this happen? How could this happen in a country we helped liberate, in a city we saved from destruction?” CNN ran a headline that bizarrely asked, “Was the Arab Spring Worth It?” Additionally, Libertarian Presidential candidate Gary Johnson asked in The Huffington Post, “As despicable as he was, would our ambassador and three other dedicated public servants have been in killed in a Gaddafi-controlled Libya? Are we safer today… after killing Gaddafi? Clearly not.”

Recently, some American politicians (Johnson is one of them) have called on ending all foreign aid to the affected countries, notably in the case of Egypt, the second largest recipient of such aid. But we must understand that Egypt has been receiving this large sum of aid for decades; two years ago the Mubarak regime received the funds before President Hosni Mubarak was ousted by the Egyptian people as a corrupt, brutal dictator. Perhaps Americans shaking their heads in disbelief and outrage are not conscious of this history, but you can be sure that Egyptians most certainly are.

For decades Egyptians lived in fear of their government. Protests and criticism directed at the Mubarak regime was often met with police batons, indefinite detention, and in other cases outright murder. Two years ago Egyptians would not have been able to march on the US embassy demanding for the end of American support for Mubarak and others like him.  For decades America subsidized such a regime, and now that regime is gone.

This type of relationship is typical of most regimes in the region, particularly so with respect to the emerging governments of the Arab Spring. Yemen’s regime has had little more than a cosmetic makeover; for the past few years, Qaddafi had started down the path of reconciliation with Western powers and Tunisian strongmen had good relations with the US for decades.

What is more, the disparaging remarks aimed at the “blossoms of the Arab Spring” take a very narrow view. Only four countries thus far have experienced a change in leadership since January 2011. These protests go beyond the borders of these few countries. Thousands are protesting in Bahrain where the protesters of the Arab Spring were crushed by their government with the support of the United States and its surrogate in Saudi Arabia. I have yet to hear anyone ask the question “Is our support of autocracy in Bahrain worth it?” Or better yet: “Is our support of any autocracy worth it?”

Imagine that you had lived your entire life fearing your government. I mean really fearing your government. For most reasonable Americans the only fear they have of their government is stirred up by the brutal injustice of a speeding. Imagine being terrified that criticizing your government might result in torture, detention, or death. What kind of feelings do you think you would have about the benefactor that distributes billions of dollars in support for your government and its policies? When your tyrant—the one you’ve lived in fear of, the one your parents and grandparents have lived in fear of—finally begins to crumble, the benefactor vanishes; and when that tyrant is gone completely the benefactor reappears and says, “You’re welcome.” How do you suspect you would feel about this benefactor?

The United States has operated in the Middle East through brutal surrogates who have exercised their power in a manner completely anathema to so-called “American values” with the full consent of the American government. When these tyrants fall, no matter what role we’ve had for the past year, we cannot expect a warm, shortsighted embrace. This is especially the case while US support for human rights violators and autocracies in the region persists.

A Note About Apologies

Recently Mitt Romney, the Republican presidential nominee, condemned Barack Obama’s administration for apologizing for America and "America's values.” Romney’s criticism came during the latest crisis in U.S. foreign policy as thousands of Muslims protested—and in some cases breached—U.S. embassies in the Middle East.  Leaving aside the fact that the Obama administration made no apology whatsoever, Romney’s chants decrying Obama’s past and present “apologies” should garner some additional attention.

When I first heard Romney make the charge, I did what I imagine most reasonable people did: I dismissed the comments as the latest in the Romney’s “post-factual” campaign and angrily affirmed “there was no apology!” I saw this same reaction from various Obama surrogates, as if—for some reason—we are all appalled by the notion.

Granted, in the case of the past week, there is little for the Obama administration to apologize for. However, this notion goes back some time. Romney and his surrogates have accused Obama of going on an international “apology tour” as far back as the Republican primary. Various factcheckers have found no evidence of any apology issued by the Obama administration.

But really:  What’s so wrong with apologizing? When did this basic concept of admitting guilt and expressing regret become so politically toxic?

Would it really be so bad for an American politician to apologize for wrongs committed in the name of US foreign policy? Would it be so unthinkable, so repugnant that an American politician might apologize for the grossly mismanaged war of choice in Iraq? The blunders committed in the aftermath of the invasion and their grisly consequences are surely not up for debate at this point. Would it be so unthinkable to express regret about overthrowing a democratically elected government in Iran in 1953? Surely we can all agree that Muhammad Mossadeq’s government would be preferable to the Iranian regime we know today.

Do Americans really believe that we are infallible? The only way forward, toward new relations in the Middle East, requires that we acknowledge our past. A moral nation—the kind that I believe America can be, the kind that I believe the American people it want to be—will not be able to acknowledge such a past without regret and remorse. If we truly wish to rebuild our reputation in the Middle East, apology will be necessary, both for our mistakes and our misdeeds.