Monday, September 2, 2013

On Striking Syria

The use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war has triggered a new wave of international outcry, this time perhaps leading to an American intervention of some kind. However, there is not—as there has never been—any clear achievable objectives within the grasp of the American military in Syria.
President Obama’s foreign policy has consistently been marked by caution rather than boldness. He began his first term with little foreign policy vision beyond extricating America from Iraq and Afghanistan and returning American foreign policy to the pre-9/11 status quo. The President’s efforts have consistently been more devoted to domestic and economic agendas, perhaps understandably so. However, when the advent of the Arab Spring impressed a historic opportunity for transformation, Obama preferred a wait-and-see approach.
The time for caution in Syria however has apparently come to an end. Lebanon, never known as a paragon of stability, is becoming more and more drawn into the Syrian tragedy as refugees continue pouring in. Jordan is facing similar strains with refugees, while King Abdullah fends off his own domestic demands for reform. It’s clear that with the conflict in Syria threatening to pull its neighbors into the storm, that there are American interests at stake here, but the question remains: Can an American-led intervention stymie the carnage in Syria?
It is patently obvious that after the blunders in Iraq and Afghanistan, that there is little will for a full-scale invasion and long-term mission of nation building and regime change seen in during the previous decade. After the chemical attack US officials indicated that there would be an immediate strike, most assumed this would mean guided missiles. While the attacks have since been delayed as Obama seeks congressional approval, such a strike would do little to abate the conflict.
Assuming that such a campaign could completely eradicate Syria’s cache of chemical weapons—a dubious assumption at best—it has been made abundantly clear by the 100,000 dead that the Assad regime excels at slaughter by more conventional means. So should the mission entail strikes on all Syrian military installations? Such a campaign would no doubt have the capacity to topple Bashar Assad and allow the rebels to takeover, but the aftermath is wholly unknown. The rebels remain a fractious bunch; while there are elements of a moderate opposition, there are Qatari and Saudi proxies that likely want only to see Assad’s regime replaced with a more amenable Sunni autocracy and al-Qaeda affiliates like Jabhat al-Nusra that prefer a more religious brand of the same oppression.
Moreover the consequences of an American strike are similarly unknown. It’s unlikely that Assad and his allies would not launch their own assault on American targets or on America’s allies. It may end in yet another conflagration between Hezbollah and Israel or retaliatory attacks on American targets elsewhere in the region. While Assad’s response is unknown, it is clear that the refugee crisis would only be exacerbated. Even the mere threat of an American strike has increased the traffic of refugees fleeing Syria, adding to the existing strains in Lebanon and Jordan. In any event, the scenario only suggests escalation, not resolution.
That is not to say that America is powerless, but rather that its military might represents the wrong type of power. Diplomatic channels are still available to the White House.
  •  Restore relations with Russia. There has been too much distance placed between Moscow and Washington over little more than the Edward Snowden embarrassment. Meanwhile lives are at stake in Syria, where American-Russian cooperation is still possible.
  • Work with Assad’s allies. To isolate Assad, America must reach out to all who are supporting him including Russia, China, and even Iran. If America is truly motivated by humanitarian concerns it will be humble enough to work with allies, competitors and enemies alike to find a solution.
  • Work with the America’s allies. The United States wields considerable influence with the countries in the Gulf like Qatar and Saudi Arabia who are the primary patrons of Syria’s rebel groups, some of which function as proxies on behalf of their financiers rather than the Syrian people. Condemn such actions and support those that facilitate a ceasefire rather than escalation.
  • Assist with neighboring countries with aid and relief efforts. The key to containing the chaos will be assisting the host countries with coping with the added strain of refugees. This is particularly important in Lebanon and Jordan, where political instability is already an issue.
  • If possible, work with Assad too. If Assad will talk, then talk to him. The idea has been floated that perhaps Assad is working to carve out a smaller enclave for his Alawite minority, allowing for a separate state to be formed elsewhere. It’s a highly problematic and morally bankrupt proposal, but if it ends the immediate bloodshed, giving the idea consideration may assist an effort toward a ceasefire. Allowing for Assad’s truncated political survival may provide a short term solution to the conflict, while allowing Russia, China and Iran to maintain one of their favored strategic partners. It’s not an idea that has a pleasant taste, nor is does it please foreign policy realists or idealists, but it may be one way of saving lives and stabilizing the situation so as create potential for further progress.


America has many advanced missiles but none of them nor all of them function as a magic bullet. A military effort will neither end the suffering of the Syrian population nor realize any aspirations for democratic change.