Where now for Palestine? Part 1: nonviolent vs armed resistance

Find the series introduction here.

Responding to Gelderloos’ criticisms of nonviolence

Nonviolence is a complicated, if not controversial topic among activists. On the one hand, I find myself hearing activists readily embracing and staunchly standing behind nonviolent strategies and rejecting all notions of violent or armed resistance. On the other, there seems to be a pervasive intellectual current among activists arguing that nonviolence is, among other adjectives, ineffective, statist, racist, patriarchal, and deluded.[1]

Nonviolence is ineffective: Peter Gelderloos published How Nonviolence Protects the State in 2007. The passage of time, particularly with respect to the developments of the 2011 Arab Spring, has done much to address his criticism that nonviolence is ineffective. That revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia began and remained nonviolent in the face of state oppression was remarkable; that they succeeded in toppling long standing dictators only emphasizes the achievement; that these revolutions toppled dictators in a less than a month strains the limits of belief and defies all of the previous conceptions about the resilience of Arab dictatorships.

It is true that the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia are by no means complete. In Egypt, the power was reorganized following Hosni Mubarak’s ouster but remained tightly controlled by the military. The free elections that took place there however have done much to erode the military’s power. Muhammad Morsi’s recent power grab in addition to what seems to be a deal being brokered between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military are certainly worrying for those hoping for a free Egypt. However, the Egyptian people have proved that they are not going to tolerate a return to dictatorship. The Egyptian populace seems to be more than willing to continue the revolution for as long as it takes however, a sign that should give us much hope.

The revolution in Libya which turned violent quite quickly—due to the Qaddafi regime’s bloody tactics—lasted much longer and cost more lives. In Syria, the results of the terrible civil war raging there now are yet to be determined and there have over 40,000 casualties thus far—again due to the disgusting onslaught of the regime. The lessons of Libya and Syria should be clear: nonviolent protest is not always the answer. I do not imagine that such a movement could have been successful in these cases, and I do not think that nonviolence should be something advocated absolutely without seriously questioning whether or not the regime in question is actually vulnerable such a movement. Palestine, though, I believe is one such case where nonviolence is the likely the only mode of resistance that can lead to the recognition of Palestinian rights and the resolution of the Palestine question.

Nonviolence is statist: Gelderloos argues that nonviolent activism “ensures a state monopoly on violence,” arguing that it does not challenge the state from a Weberian point of view. Here I disagree entirely. Max Weber argued that a state is defined (in one sense) by holding a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Naturally, using force illegitimately besmirches the state and tends to erode its power. Looking again to the Arab Spring, we can see that many of these uprisings started out quite small. But case after case, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Syria, Bahrain, when the state began brutalizing protesters, the opposition was galvanized and burgeoned beyond what it was before the state delegitimized itself. This was the case in Deraa, in Tahrir Square, in Manama Square, on and on. The oppressive states’ power continued to break down the more they attempted to intimidate and kill their opponents.

Nonviolence is racist/patriarchal: Gelderloos arguments in these chapters tend to get somewhat farfetched in my opinion, but I understand where he is coming from. “Nonviolence,” Gelderloss writes, “is an inherently privileged position in the modern context… Pacifism assumes that white people who grew up in the suburbs with all their basic needs met can counsel oppressed people, many of whom are people of color, to suffer patiently under an inconceivably greater violence, until such time as the Great white father is swayed by the movements demands…” His arguments are similar with regard to patriarchy. The more vitriolic (perhaps absurd) rhetoric aside, I do agree to a point that someone like me (a white, middle class, American male) is privileged, and that calling on Palestinians in Gaza to go on a hunger strike or to join hands around a bonfire while bombs are raining down on their heads is patently immoral. It seems to me, however, that when Hamas and other militant groups responded to Israel’s attacks with indiscriminate rocket fire it only served to reinforce the racist notions about Palestinians in the West. Moreover it did not save Palestinian lives and failed to deter the Israeli onslaught. During such a crisis, the immediate goal must be a ceasefire which is very difficult to initiate in the middle of a conflict.

The argument for violence in this case, which I do think can be justified as a form of Palestinian resistance given the violence perpetrated upon them by Israel, would have to show that militant groups in the Gaza Strip could in anyway defeat the Israeli military. It is not a racist nor patriarchal nor privileged mindset that leads me to conclude that such a victory is not possible. Furthermore, the only way to induce a change in policy from the Israeli government is to induce a change in the Israeli populace; it defies logic to think that this can be accomplished by firing rockets at civilian population centers.

Additionally, I would never advocate that anyone “suffer patiently.” Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians demand resistance, and I find it hard to tolerate an opposing view in this regard. This is one reason why I think the Palestinians should refrain from negotiating with Israel. There is nothing to be negotiated. There should be demands substantiated by actions. Nonviolence, when practiced properly, should not in any way advocate passivity.

To be fair, Gelderloss argues for a diversity of tactics and for a more sober assessment of nonviolence than is typically represented by absolutist ideological advocates of nonviolence. Gelderloos’ work is important for this rather myopic strain of activism that I think permeates movements today. However, these criticisms, while important to be mindful of, do not discredit nonviolence altogether. Indeed, this is not Gelderloos’ goal. In some cases though, nonviolence is the most effective, practical path to social change. I believe this is the case for Palestine.

Nonviolence and Palestine

Nonviolence has been employed in numerous settings for a myriad of different goals, from independence movements to workers rights to overthrowing dictators. Palestine, however, represents a special case.

Palestine is, first and foremost, confronted by Zionism, an ideological colonial movement. Nonviolence has been employed in numerous colonial settings, the most well-known being the case of India. While the historical circumstances of the British Empire’s departure are far more complex than simply Mohandas Gandhi’s movement, there can be no doubt the strategy of noncooperation was a key factor. Faced with the aftermath of World War II, the British Empire was exhausted and largely on the decline. Maintaining rule over a defiant populace in a country far away was simply not feasible. But a violent uprising would have had several detrimental effects on a post-colonial India. Obviously, there would have been a significantly higher number of casualties, but also the political transition would have been dictated by military leaders, the results of which are always highly uncertain. Recently a 2005 Freedom House report demonstrated this point, concluding that in transitions where nonviolence is the primary mode of resistance, there is a much higher likelihood that the transition will result in a freer society rather than merely another authoritarian regime.

However, Palestine is not simply a colonial asset attempting to transition to independence, nor is it just an autocracy attempting a transition to democracy. The West Bank and Gaza Strip have been under Israeli military occupation since 1967. There are precedents for nonviolent applications here as well: in 2005 Syria pulled its troops out of Lebanon, ending a military occupation that began in 1976. This occupation ended when confronted by a popular uprising following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The popular uprising lasted for approximately two months, before Syrian withdrawal in spite of counter protests put together by Hezbollah, a key regional ally for Syria. There had been several attacks on protest leaders, including more assassinations, but nevertheless the Syrian occupation ended. Regionally and domestically, the prospect of massacring Lebanese protesters, through proxies or otherwise—was not a viable option for Syria. The Syrian withdrawal had more to do with being able to retain nominal control over Lebanon through its clandestine operatives as well as through its partners in Hezbollah. In other words Syrian influence over Lebanon was transformed, though nonetheless diminished.

Historically, for Palestinians nonviolence has been the primary mode of successful resistance. The first intifada was a wildly successful uprising. The Palestine Question was thrust into the public spotlight, not in the usual, problematic depiction of militants attacking Israeli targets from Lebanon or Jordan, but rather in the form of young men throwing stones at tanks. Images of Israeli soldiers following Yitzhak Rabin’s orders to “break their bones” were covered by the media and it is this crisis of international legitimacy and public relations that led to negotiations with the PLO, culminating in the Oslo Accords. The problem is that rather than rethink the logic and moral calculus of Israeli policies, Israel found a Palestinian leader willing to act as a surrogate for a reformatted form of occupation and crush the uprising. Yasser Arafat was at his weakest point politically when he agreed to be Israel’s enforcer, and he and the returning exile leadership took to the task with a remarkable zeal.[2] Thus, what very well could have been a nonviolent revolution of Palestinian independence was completely subverted by a weak leader thrust into negotiations. Nevertheless, this form of resistance forced Israel to shift positions.

Armed resistance, however, has been a historic failure often accompanied by monumental tragedies. The cross border raids by the PLO from its inception in 1964 unto the late 80s achieved little, if anything tangible at all. Launched from Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, the logic of these attacks was to goad Israel into a response, and forcing these states to respond to breaches of sovereignty, presumably leading a large scale war where Arab states would finally liberate Palestine. What happened in reality however, was that Israel responded with a show strength (if not brutality), and, rather than confront a consistently more advanced Israeli military, the host states blamed the Palestinians and sought to control and punish those within their borders.

Hamas’s tactics have consistently ended in failure as well, and has clearly been recognized by Israel to be a useful tool for avoiding and subverting negotiations and subsequent obligations. But what has Hamas actually accomplished through bombings, rocket attacks, and other deplorable acts of violence other than mayhem? During the 1996 Israeli election cycle, a bombing campaign by Hamas brought to the Likud government to power under the leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu. The second intifada resulted in much more death than the first; the attacks on Israeli civilians dominated the media’s focus away from nonviolent efforts and played into Israel’s never-questioned narrative of self-defense.

Hamas’ prideful participation in Israel’s escalation with Gaza’s militants resulted in over 1,400 killed in December-January 2008-2009 and over 150 killed this past November. Bizarrely, the most recent episode has been lauded as a success for Hamas because of Israeli concession achieved through negotiations in Israel. This perception is based on the ludicrous premise that Israel will honor these obligations. If there is any evidence that suggests that Israel intends to lift the siege of Gaza and begin treating the Palestinians there with any sort of decency, I’ve not yet seen it. Furthermore, even if we consider the terms of the ceasefire a victory for the Palestinians, it was not at the point of a gun that Israel agreed to these terms. It was through a process of mediation due to a new Egypt that is no longer willing to be as complicit as the Mubarak regime was.[3]

Israel is particularly vulnerable to nonviolent resistance with respect to the Palestinians. Israeli officials frequently cite Israel as the only democracy in the Middle East, an assertion that goes too often unquestioned. There are emerging democracies all over the region. Perhaps then these Israeli officials mean that Israel is the only liberal democracy in the region? This is a wildly problematic statement when considering Israel’s treatment of the Palestinian minority in its own country. Nevertheless, this assertion is very easily called into question when juxtaposed to images of Israeli soldiers beating and shooting unarmed demonstrators, i.e. the first intifada.

Another critical issue is that Israel relies on Western support, particularly American support. For the same reason that the Mubarak regime, unquestionably an illiberal dictatorship, could not sustain American support while murdering the nonviolent protesters that occupied Tahrir Square, Israel could not maintain American support while brutalizing unarmed, nonviolent protesters. In Bahrain the uprising was crushed with American support through its proxies in the Bahraini and Saudi Arabian governments. However, while Bahrain’s uprising went largely ignored by the western media and its coverage began to dwindle as it went on, Egypt’s uprising dominated the headlines and the evening news as the media still found the revolution to be sensational and fresh enough to cover day in and day out.  

The American populace is largely uneducated about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, if they are aware of it at all. Most Americans, in my experience, support Israel for either for ideological reasons stemming from certain eschatological Christian views as well as from ignorant notions of Palestinians terrorists. In the first case, while Americans may support a Jewish state for the sake of ushering in the end times, there is little to do about confronting such a mindset. However, supporting the existence of a Jewish state does not necessitate the murder of Palestinians and many Christians, I believe, would hesitate to support murderous campaigns against peaceful demonstrators. For those Americans that support Israel because of a bastardized interpretation of the global ‘War on Terror,’ this support cannot sustain itself when confronted with images of nonviolent Palestinian resistance.

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[1] For these accounts, which will be addressed albeit briefly below, see Gelderloos, Peter. How Nonviolence Protects the State. Cambridge, MA: South End, 2007. Churchill, Ward, and Mike Ryan. Pacifism as Pathology: Reflections on the Role of Armed Struggle in North America. Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring, 1998.

[2] The PLO’s base in Lebanon had been decimated by civil war, Syrian intervention, and an Israeli campaign that targeted the group directly. The PLO now sat off in distant Tunis, far from the borderlands of historic Palestine. Arafat blundered yet again when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, perilously backing the Iraqi dictator. Following Hussein’s defeat, Kuwait expelled the Palestinian laborers there as punishment while other Gulf States cut funding to the PLO. Diplomatically and geographically isolated, financially bankrupt, and now confronted with an uprising that began without any PLO input whatsoever, Arafat and the leadership in exile were fast becoming politically irrelevant.

[3] However, we cannot let the Morsi government off the hook so long as they are complicit in Israel’s blockade of Gaza.

Where now for Palestine? Series introduction

On 29 November 2012, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) recognized Palestine as a non-member observer state; with 138 for, 9 against, and 41 abstentions, the motion was overwhelmingly supported by the planet Earth. Palestine was explicitly recognized as the Gaza Strip and West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Israel (the current occupier of Palestine) and the United States (the primary financier of the occupation) were the most notable nations among the opposition.

One would hope, in the face of such a massive consensus, that the losers might consider some form of introspection. This has thus far not been the case. Israel has announced that it will proceed with the long-planned construction of the settlement bloc known as E-1. If fully implemented the construction would result in a large scale project on the land between Jerusalem and the illegal settlement Ma’ale Adumim. First, this would result in the de facto annexation of occupied East Jerusalem. Moreover, E-1 would effectively bifurcate the West Bank by restricting access between the north and south to a narrow corridor avoiding new settlements and the already existing military areas which Israel insists are a part of its plan for “defensible borders” as well as a “demilitarized Palestinian state.” The US for its part continued to prove that disdain for Palestinian self-determination is the only thing that can bring Democrats and Republicans together.

The near global recognition of Palestine, regardless of the rather pitiful head-in-the-sand detractors, is a monumental achievement. However, as has anyone will observe, the reality of occupation and continued Israeli sovereignty over Palestine has not changed and is not likely to do so anytime soon.

I had a brief twitter exchange with a Palestinian yesterday who remarked:

Lena Ibrahim: How do we move forward? …and I personally don’t believe the answer to the current 1 apartheid state is a “2 state solution.”
E/A: Middle East: The trick, as far as I can tell, is breaking through to the people of Israel. The people running the [government] are lost causes.
Lena Ibrahim: I agree but I think that’s really tough. It will take generations even after peace to change racist perception by Israelis… only because that’s really all they are taught about the Palestinians, very negative and racist stigmas.”
E/A: Middle East: I agree. That’s why I advocate radical nonviolent activism and dialogue—NOT NEGOTIATIONS. Only way to break those views

 Of course, this exchange requires quite a bit of unpacking, and I hope to dig a bit deeper in the remainder of this series. But I’d like to set out some initial thoughts before going much deeper. 

1) An outsider, like myself, prescribing and advocating nonviolence for people who routinely suffer terror and oppression at the hands of power is always problematic. This is a critique I am all too conscious of. However, accepting the premise that dialogue and interaction with the Israeli populace—as opposed to the ineffectual and/or harmful negotiations pursued by the current Palestinian leadership—is the key to a fundamental change of dynamic between Israel and Palestine, nonviolence is simply the most practical way forward. Setting aside all conceptions of flowery rhetoric on the “goodness” of nonviolence, I would ask the skeptics and critics of nonviolence to accept the fact that Israel is a democracy; it’s intractable, far-right politicians are elected and preserved by popular opinion. Rockets and bombs are no more likely to evoke empathy among Israelis than blockades and massacres are likely to evoke submission among Palestinians. One caveat I would like to add is that there are too Palestinian perceptions that would have to change. Palestinians, just like their Israeli counterparts, are “taught… very negative and racist stigmas.” The difference, I think is that these stigmas would rapidly wither away without the daily reinforcement of Israeli occupation and aggression. 

 2) The reason I oppose negotiations is because there is very little, at the moment, to negotiate about. On the issue of Palestinian refugees’ right of return: even if one rejects mainstream academia’s conclusion that Israel expelled approximately 750,000 Palestinians in 1948 and accepts Israel’s narrative that they simply left of their own volition for fear of war, these refugees still have the right to return to their homeland according to international law. On the issue of territory: Israel imposed its sovereignty over the Gaza Strip and West Bank (including East Jerusalem) after it conquered the territory during the 1967 war; gaining territory through conquest is prohibited by international law; settlements and other forms of unilateral Israeli expansion have rightly been denounced as illegal since 1967 and remain as such today. On the issue of “demilitarization”: A neutered Palestinian state that relies on Israel for its security, is forbidden to make independent treaties, and does not have control over its borders, airspace and coastal waters, is neither sovereign nor independent and has thus never been nor will be an acceptable substitute for an actual Palestinian state. The goal for Palestinians, as far as I can tell, is getting the Israeli populace—and eventually the Israeli leadership—to understand this. However, it only takes an informed glance at the history of the so-called “peace process” to determine that negotiations are merely a forum for Palestinian capitulation, rather than real political settlement.  

3) A successful campaign of nonviolence would require a massive amount of mobilization and consensus among Palestinian society—this includes the Palestinian leadership, heretofore complicit in the Israeli occupation. The premise of nonviolence, at its heart, is refusal to acknowledge and obey the avatars of power, however this is requires an active, provocative process. The Palestinian Authority (PA) that currently operates as a subcontractor of Palestinian oppression will have to be reformed and reconstructed; Hamas will have to be confronted about its use of armed resistance; indeed these should be the first targets of change for activists in Palestine. Hamas, strange as it may sound, is much more likely to consider the measure than is the PA. Hamas has shown interest in a long term ceasefire, and appear willing to reconsider armed resistance. The PA, however, while tacitly supporting certain nonviolent gestures, relies politically, financially, and materially on playing their part in the Oslo model of Palestinian oppression. The recent recognition by the UNGA, however, provides numerous opportunities for the PA to shed such shackles. 

The objective of this series will be to add specificity the arguments listed above. The blue print for the series is first to address specific criticisms and shortcomings of nonviolence, and how this relates to a possible Palestinian movement. In Part 2, I wanted to briefly (and somewhat inadequately) address the history—successes and failures—of nonviolent activism, armed resistance, and negotiations in the in the last two decades of so. Finally, followed by specific prescriptions both for Palestinian and international activists as well as for, hopefully, a modified more activist PA that could embrace and facilitate such a movement in Part 3. 

I would welcome appreciate comments and thoughts regarding: 1) Criticisms/thoughts on nonviolence; 2) the appeal of armed resistance; 3) the benefit of negotiations; and 4) your personal ideas on specific nonviolent strategies. I will give all comments consideration as I work through this series. 

Follow me on Twitter at @Adam_Wes_S and on Facebook at Expert/Activist: Middle East.