After a five-day campaign, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has
seized most of Mosul, the provincial capital of Nineveh in northwestern Iraq. The Iraqi security forces largely
abandoned their posts, effectively ceding the city to the transnational jihadists of ISIS. The time to act is now. Though Iraq is not at risk of outright collapse, it is on the verge of a major cataclysm. Political progress, particularly with the Sunni communities victimized by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's thuggish form of governance of the past few years, could have a transformative effect on the wider region.
Background to the current crisis
ISIS is the
successor to the United States' old enemy al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), but due to a falling out with al-Qaeda's core leadership, the group has since begun a campaign of savagery wholly independent of other al-Qaeda affiliates, becoming the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). During 2012, the capacity of Iraq's government began to swell. But as the Syrian uprising snowballed into the civil war it is today, ISI saw an opportunity to capitalize on Syria's desperate Sunni population. In 2013 ISIS expanded its operations to Syria where government power was on the wane. Thus ISI became ISIS, and it began courting new constituencies outside the borders of Iraq. Though operations in Iraq where never entirely dormant, ISIS's attention became
focused on territory seized in eastern Syria.
Though much of the credit for the end or Iraq's bloody civil war is attributed by Western military analysts to the surge that began in 2007, a critical component of the civil wars end was the so-called Sahwa (Awakening) that occurred within Iraq's Sunni population. Iraq's post-civil war order was far from perfect, but there at least seemed to be the promise of rapprochement between political blocs that largely aligned themselves according to ethnic or sectarian backgrounds. Unfortunately, despite some positive signs, Sunnis in Iraq continue to be disenfranchised and lingering grievances continue to serve as open wounds, exacerbating relations with Baghdad and eroding broader faith in the national project.
ISIS continued to covertly expand its contacts in Western Iraq as it continued to acquire battle experience and better equipment and funding from its efforts in Syria. Unlike other rebel groups in Syria, ISIS's goal is not simply the end of the Assad regime, but the construction of a fascist state with pretense of extremist pan-Islamic trappings. Funded by
extortion rackets and
black market oil sales, feeding off disenfranchised and desperate constituencies in both Syria and Iraq, and now armed better than ever before, ISIS can safely be said to be stronger today than it during any of its previous incarnations.
2013 in particular was a devastating year for the potential for a new political order in Iraq--a boon for ISIS' opportunistic recruiters. The year began with a crackdown on a protest sit-in in
Hawija, where the government admits twenty-seven people were killed; the protesters claim almost twice as much lost their lives, with 120 wounded and many more in prison. Another protest in December 2013 was dispersed with similar brutality in
Ramadi. The protesters demands are not uncommon; they are indeed echoed elsewhere in the region calling for an end to disenfranchisement, discrimination, and access to economic opportunity. Following the incident in Ramadi, an uprising began in earnest and ISIS clearly realized the time was right to begin making moves, and has since seized Fallujah and parts of Ramadi. They've staged numerous attacks around the country beyond the bounds of Anbar province, threatening to re-mobilize Shia militias and plunge the country back to the bloodiest days of the 2007-2008 civil war.
Prospects for the Future: Three Scenarios
1: ISIS keeps Mosul and continues to capture other Iraqi cities? Incredibly doubtful. The idea that ISIS can keep Mosul would be completely laughable if not for the corruption and ineptitude of Iraq's security forces. However, ISIS's expansion in Iraq comes with obvious limitations. Even with the current alliances gained with some Sunni tribes in the West, further gains would require new constituencies that ISIS is simply unable to cultivate. More to the point, most of Iraq's population--the Sunnis included--are completely opposed to ISIS. The semi-autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) is the most serious threat to the jihadists at the moment. ISIS's advance to Mosul, far too close to the KRG, will prove to be very similar to Icarus flying too close to the sun. The Peshmerga, the KRG's own security forces, are currently
poised near Mosul, at the very least to contain the crisis from spilling over into their own environs, but no doubt willing to assist in efforts to purge the city of ISIS marauders. Despite the likelihood that ISIS will fail here, they have already succeeded in capturing heavy weapons used by the Iraqi military. Already there are
reports of US humvees captured in Mosul being seen in Syria.
2: ISIS loses Mosul and the conflict returns to what it was before June 10? The most likely outcome. With ISIS defeat in Mosul seemingly certain, the most likely scenario is that the conflict reverts back to its previous incarnation. With Anbar in chaos as ISIS and other groups use it as a base for attacks around Iraq, slowly but surely increasing tensions. Rather than actually retaining Mosul, this is the scenario that actors should be most concerned about as--aside from being very likely--it is also the formative threat to the viability of Iraq. ISIS does not have the capacity to conquer town by town the entire country. It's simply unfeasible. But, operating from the safety of Anbar as the Iraq government continues its bumbling response, it threatens to exacerbate tensions and plunge the country back into civil war.
3: A turning point toward a new Iraq? Difficult, but certainly worth the effort. The current impasse in Iraq has the potential to mobilize Iraqis on a national level. This is an existential threat that will require a genuine initiative of confidence-building and conflict resolution. The fact that every party in Iraq has a stake in this fight means that Iraq could be on the verge of a unity heretofore unheard in the country. It's important that this potential be realized both within Iraq and by outside observers, and all parties act to realize such a possibility. Iraq needs a new political order, and it must commit now to security sector reform. That's no easy task in the middle of such a conflict, but those same security forces are largely responsible for said conflict. The fact that Mosul was taken so quickly is a testament to the cowardice and clientelism of these security forces and has further eroded the government's credibility. Admitting that their performance has been until now wholly unacceptable will not shock anyone--likely not even the security forces. The government should commit to effective security forces that are curtailed by the rule of law and whose purpose are to serve and protect the people of Iraq.
- Press the central government to make concessions. This, really, should be the axis around which other international action be taken. The government has to appease its citizens--not ISIS. The political violence in western Iraq is largely the result of an anti-government uprising that ISIS is capitalizing on to make its gains. If the government can win back its citizens in the western provinces, ISIS will be defeated. It's by no means a simple task, but if such a complex endeavor could be realized it would indeed function as a silver bullet.
- Maliki must go. The first order of business should be for Iraq's political landscape to maneuver to oust Maliki. This part should be easy enough. Though he won the most votes during the April 30 elections, he did not win a majority and can still be beaten by a coalition. Moreover, if his own State of Law Coalition can be convinced to choose a new candidate that is not Maliki, this could signal to Iraqis that change is indeed on the way and that the personalized, clientelistic rule of Maliki is soon coming to an end.
- Pay the Peshmerga. The KRG has largely been on the verge of secession. Paying its security forces could be the first step to rebuilding the Kurdish buy-in into the Iraqi political process. They will be essential in defeating ISIS, who currently seems to have eyes on Kirkuk and Baghdad, not Erbil. ISIS likely rightly assesses KRG coherency and capacity as a dead end. It's important nonetheless to secure Kurdish support for the government's coming offensive against ISIS.
- Address Sunni grievances in the West. To deprive ISIS of its safe-havens in western Iraq, the government must make an effort to recapture the buy-in of aggrieved tribesmen and others that have joined ISIS. These types of alliances--be they in Iraq or Yemen or Syria--are often temporary and based on localized material and political demands rather than some grand ideology like those touted by transnational jihadist groups like ISIS. By meeting with Sunni leaders, releasing political prisoners, and outright repealing "debaathifaction" laws the Iraq government restore some confidence that will allow it to pursue broader reforms and further erode support for ISIS.
- National Dialogue. Iraq would do well to pursue a serious national dialogue, learning from other experiences in the region. There are precedents from Yemen and Tunisia that have important lessons to teach the region and can help heal the deep wounds in society. Maliki recently announced such an effort, but the problem now is that no one has any faith in his ability to execute such a program with any degree of sincerity.
- Engage Iraq's neighbors. Getting support for Maliki's ouster and for the reforms needed to put the pieces of Iraq back together into something coherent and stable will require a multilateral effort. It would likely require, simultaneously Gulf states, Iran, and the United States to agree on policy toward Iraq. (*Gulp*) Again, as insurmountable as that idea might seem, all of these actors oppose ISIS with vigor and understand that the group represents a threat to their interests. All of these actors have a vested interest in avoiding a civil war in Iraq. There are numerous issues that may stand in the way, be it the Syrian conflict or Iran's nuclear program or whatever the latest squabble is, but there is room for consensus among Iraq's most influential interlopers. For better or worse, these states all wield considerable influence on Iraq's domestic politics and they will have to be confronted if a coherent, effective policy is to succeed.
- Beware of military support. The Iraq government needs military support, but such efforts should be mindful of the military's past performance and abuses. There are numerous reason to be weary. The Iraqi army has used its military to crush political opponents, and empowering the government may only erode conflict resolution efforts and discredit international support if the military continues with previous abuses. Furthermore the gains made by ISIS have resulted in heavy weapons--much of which supplied by the US--falling into ISIS hands which only escalates the severity of the conflict. All international actors giving assistance to the government Iraq should make it clear that such aid is conditional on fighting transnational jihadists and not turning them on disgruntled domestic political factions. Already, Maliki has announced his intention to pay anyone willing to fight ISIS, which only threatens to reform militias not accountable to the government.
- Aid for IDPs. Internally displaced persons (IDP) have been flooding into neighboring provinces from western provinces for months, and now Mosul can be included in said cataclysm. It's important that these people in need not be left in dire straits for too long lest the become vulnerable to the temptation of political violence themselves in some form or another.
