A Crash Course in Iraq’s Electoral Politics

My article breaking down the political players and major issues in the upcoming Iraqi elections was published on The Atlantic Council's MENASource blog.

"On April 30, Iraq will hold parliamentary elections featuring a total of 9,040 candidates from 142 parties, including forty-one blocs and coalitions, all competing for just 328 parliamentary seats. The result of the 2010 parliamentary elections carried Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiya bloc to a narrow electoral victory, but was eventually defeated by a coalition of majority-Shia parties to ensure a second term for Nuri al-Maliki. As Maliki seeks another four years as Iraq’s prime minister, the political scene has changed dramatically and issues, both new and old, take center stage as voters weigh their options. 

"Security remains at the forefront of Iraqi politics. The civil war in Syria and the transnational jihadist organizations’ activities on Iraq’s western border have exploited and exacerbated long running grievances between the local Sunni population and the central government. The lingering "de-baathification” legacy has been used by Maliki, some say, to discriminate against critics, particularly Sunnis. Following the December 2013 crackdown on the protest camp in Anbar province’s capital of Ramadi and the arrest of prominent Sunni leaders, clashes erupted throughout the province. Currently, organizations like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other militant groups have come to temporary agreements with local anti-government militias and tribal groups. The loss of control in Anbar has threatened the rest of the country as well, with militants seizing control of the Fallujah Dam and closing off the Euphrates river. Its closure has caused flooding in some areas and extreme water scarcity in others. Elsewhere, ISIS forces and other militant groups have staged attacks in Shia neighborhoods, threatening to reignite sectarian tensions and mobilize independent militias. This recent escalation in violence has already claimed 2,650 lives since the beginning of the year."

Read the full article here.

The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Human Rights in the Transitioning Countries

My article contrasting the state of human rights in before and after the Arab Spring was published on The Atlantic Council's MENASource blog. This article was subsequently recommended by Foreign Policy Magazine's Democracy Lab.

"More than three years have passed since tide of the Arab Spring swept through the region, carrying away in its undertow three Presidents-for-life as well as one Brother-Leader. At the heart of the movements that coalesced in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen was a desire for democratic reform and a final sunset on the decades-old systems of repression and human rights abuses. However, a comparative view of the current state of human rights today versus that of 2010 reveals the emerging patterns defining the people's relationship with the state in the post-Arab Spring era. The US Department of State’s annual review of human rights provides an opportunity to assess what progress has been made as well as how very far the transitioning countries have left to go."

Read the full article here.

Reform or Insurgency in Bahrain

My article on the need for reform in Bahrain was published on The Atlantic Council's MENASource blog.

"The use of more violent means of confrontation in Bahrain is becoming more prevalent—at least on the part of a minority of anti-regime groups—as state security forces continue to use repressive measures against dissidents, employing beatings, tear gas, and birdshot on otherwise peaceful demonstrators. The deterioration in security has also created space for extremism to rear its head. On February 14, amidst protests marking the third anniversary of Bahrain’s uprising, the militant group al-Ashtar Brigades bombed a minibus carrying police officers in Dih west of Manama, wounding several; another bombing targeted police near the country’s airport, killing one. On Monday, another bombing occurred during confrontations with protesters.

"The situation in Bahrain—coupled with an obstinate lack of movement from Bahrain’s international partners—is wholly unsustainable. Unlike other Gulf States, Bahrain’s monarchy has a much narrower scope of loyal elites with which to collude and far more modest coffers with which to offset popular grievances."

Read the full article here.

To Confront Yemen’s Security Dilemmas, Start With Security Forces

My article on the desperate need for security sector reform in Yemen was published on The Atlantic Council's MENASource blog.

"Despite the conclusion of Yemen’s National Dialogue, violence continues to plague the country, most notably with clashes between tribesman and separatists pressing for greater autonomy and government forces that have lost their confidence. The recent incidents in al-Dali’ province illustrate this acutely, where tribesmen and the Thirty-Third Armored Brigade erupted in conflict after local militants associated with Southern separatists fired at a water convoy en route to the brigade’s base; the incident escalated into a conflict defined by an all too typical, indiscriminate military shelling of civilian infrastructure. The fighting in al-Dali’ centers on a specific military outfit: the Thirty-Third Armored Brigade is infamous among locals, especially after its December shelling of a funeral killed more than twenty people—some of them children. The subsequent investigation of the incident has been kept confidential and no prosecutions were made in its wake.

"Echoing wider calls in the country for local autonomy and reflecting the National Dialogue Conference’s (NDC) call for decentralization, the local tribes have demanded the Brigade be removed from al-Dali’—and the province’s security manager agrees, saying, “Its existence in the governorate is provoking further Southern calls for secession.” The central government informed the Brigade in late January that its leading officer was to be dismissed, the bare minimum one would expect after an incident like the December shelling. The brigade refused the order, choosing instead to fortify their compound and surround it with tanks."

Read the full article here.

Dictatorships: Just Do It

Essentially, the concept of nation branding functions as a (normally privatized) form of propaganda. Because suppressing dissent, torturing protest organizers and using excessive force on unarmed demonstrators generally requires all hands on deck, autocratic regimes are occasionally forced outsource the management of their foreign propaganda to smaller public relations firms abroad.

In September, just a month after the biggest massacre of civilians in Egypt’s history, it was announced that the country's military bosses overseeing the mass killing were looking to hire professional apologists and advocates in Washington. I know what you’re thinking, “You mean that just one month after nearly 600 civilians were killed and nearly 4,000 people were injured in a pretty one-sided battle between state security forces and supporters of a democratically-elected president who those security forces had forced out, the state began shopping around the contract to advocate on its behalf in Washington? Why, golly, who want such a contract?”

Dear reader, let me tell you: The Glover Park Group! And think for a second. How much money would it take for you to sell your soul and go to the hill every day to convince legislators that a bunch murderous oligarchs are in fact worthy of taxpayer-funded military aid? How’s $250,000 a month sound? Some people would have serious problems with this arrangement. These are what I like to call “decent, reasonable human beings.” On the other hand there are people who would jump at the chance. In the immortal words of Willard Romney, “Corporations are people, my friend.” Unfortunately, as far as people go, corporations are sociopaths.

Take Bell Pottinger for instance. They have a reputation as being the definitive global advocates of the earth’s most powerful scum. From Belarus to Bahrain, Bell Pottinger seems to have no qualms about defending the most terrible opponents of human freedom and dignity around the world. In 2011, undercover reporters from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism went in to Bell Pottinger’s office posing as representatives of the Government of Uzbekistan and of said country’s cotton industry. Topic of the day: how best can Uzbekistan polish its awful record on the use of child labor in its cotton fields. During the interview Bell Pottinger representatives bragged to undercover journalist about their influence with the UK’s government and their ability to use “dark arts” to scrub their reputation on the internet. It was an embarrassing scandal for the firm, but fear not, corporations don’t have feels, and Bell Pottinger’s dark arts continue to be practiced. The firm is currently in the hunt for Bahrain’s new public relations contract.

“Nation branding.” The phrase itself should make you feel dirty. Really dirty. Like a Hosni-Mubarak-giving-you-a-foot-massage kind of dirty. The reason being: I work full-time at unpaid internship that pushes the US government and international actors to put more pressure on the government of Bahrain. It can be difficult working for no pay, sure, but I really love the work I do and the projects I get to work on, like drafting letters to congressmen, documenting human rights abuses, etc.

What really screws me up though, is that somewhere out there is a ‘Mirror, Mirror’ version of me interning at some soulless PR firm drafting press releases selling Bahrain as a great place for an international sporting event—if you consider driving a car really, really fast a sport. Don’t let political prisoners wasting away due to lack of treatment bum you out; never mind persistent allegations of torture; ignore the largely foreign police force imported from abroad to bludgeon the locals: This spring break it’s “Destination Bahrain: A nation on a Journey!”

Somewhere there are people as passionate about subverting natural inclinations of human solidarity (aka “dark arts”) as I am about undermining the efforts of despots. 

On Striking Syria

The use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war has triggered a new wave of international outcry, this time perhaps leading to an American intervention of some kind. However, there is not—as there has never been—any clear achievable objectives within the grasp of the American military in Syria.

President Obama’s foreign policy has consistently been marked by caution rather than boldness. He began his first term with little foreign policy vision beyond extricating America from Iraq and Afghanistan and returning American foreign policy to the pre-9/11 status quo. The President’s efforts have consistently been more devoted to domestic and economic agendas, perhaps understandably so. However, when the advent of the Arab Spring impressed a historic opportunity for transformation, Obama preferred a wait-and-see approach.

The time for caution in Syria however has apparently come to an end. Lebanon, never known as a paragon of stability, is becoming more and more drawn into the Syrian tragedy as refugees continue pouring in. Jordan is facing similar strains with refugees, while King Abdullah fends off his own domestic demands for reform. It’s clear that with the conflict in Syria threatening to pull its neighbors into the storm, that there are American interests at stake here, but the question remains: Can an American-led intervention stymie the carnage in Syria?

It is patently obvious that after the blunders in Iraq and Afghanistan, that there is little will for a full-scale invasion and long-term mission of nation building and regime change seen in during the previous decade. After the chemical attack US officials indicated that there would be an immediate strike, most assumed this would mean guided missiles. While the attacks have since been delayed as Obama seeks congressional approval, such a strike would do little to abate the conflict.

Assuming that such a campaign could completely eradicate Syria’s cache of chemical weapons—a dubious assumption at best—it has been made abundantly clear by the 100,000 dead that the Assad regime excels at slaughter by more conventional means. So should the mission entail strikes on all Syrian military installations? Such a campaign would no doubt have the capacity to topple Bashar Assad and allow the rebels to takeover, but the aftermath is wholly unknown. The rebels remain a fractious bunch; while there are elements of a moderate opposition, there are Qatari and Saudi proxies that likely want only to see Assad’s regime replaced with a more amenable Sunni autocracy and al-Qaeda affiliates like Jabhat al-Nusra that prefer a more religious brand of the same oppression.

Moreover the consequences of an American strike are similarly unknown. It’s unlikely that Assad and his allies would not launch their own assault on American targets or on America’s allies. It may end in yet another conflagration between Hezbollah and Israel or retaliatory attacks on American targets elsewhere in the region. While Assad’s response is unknown, it is clear that the refugee crisis would only be exacerbated. Even the mere threat of an American strike has increased the traffic of refugees fleeing Syria, adding to the existing strains in Lebanon and Jordan. In any event, the scenario only suggests escalation, not resolution.

That is not to say that America is powerless, but rather that its military might represents the wrong type of power. Diplomatic channels are still available to the White House.

•  Restore relations with Russia. There has been too much distance placed between Moscow and Washington over little more than the Edward Snowden embarrassment. Meanwhile lives are at stake in Syria, where American-Russian cooperation is still possible.
  
• Work with Assad’s allies. To isolate Assad, America must reach out to all who are supporting him including Russia, China, and even Iran. If America is truly motivated by humanitarian concerns it will be humble enough to work with allies, competitors and enemies alike to find a solution.
  
• Work with the America’s allies. The United States wields considerable influence with the countries in the Gulf like Qatar and Saudi Arabia who are the primary patrons of Syria’s rebel groups, some of which function as proxies on behalf of their financiers rather than the Syrian people. Condemn such actions and support those that facilitate a ceasefire rather than escalation.
  
• Assist with neighboring countries with aid and relief efforts. The key to containing the chaos will be assisting the host countries with coping with the added strain of refugees. This is particularly important in Lebanon and Jordan, where political instability is already an issue.
  
• If possible, work with Assad too. If Assad will talk, then talk to him. The idea has been floated that perhaps Assad is working to carve out a smaller enclave for his Alawite minority, allowing for a separate state to be formed elsewhere. It’s a highly problematic and morally bankrupt proposal, but if it ends the immediate bloodshed, giving the idea consideration may assist an effort toward a ceasefire. Allowing for Assad’s truncated political survival may provide a short term solution to the conflict, while allowing Russia, China and Iran to maintain one of their favored strategic partners. It’s not an idea that has a pleasant taste, nor is does it please foreign policy realists or idealists, but it may be one way of saving lives and stabilizing the situation so as create potential for further progress.

America has many advanced missiles but none of them nor all of them function as a magic bullet. A military effort will neither end the suffering of the Syrian population nor realize any aspirations for democratic change.

Democracy in Egypt: There is no military solution

Muhammad Morsi is a bad president. Let us allow a brief re-cap for the uninitiated: Morsi has failed to protect Egypt’s minorities, including Shiites and Christians; under his administration, the economy has continued to crumble with inflation rates ever out of control; crime is a persistent problem as police and the interior ministry remain unsolvable Gordian knots beyond the reach of reform; Morsi oversaw the ham-fisted imposition of a grossly inadequate constitution; and who could forget in late 2012 when he infamously, albeit temporarily, made himself pharaoh, placing himself beyond the reach of judicial oversight. The tamarod (rebel) campaign, a grassroots initiative circulating a petition of no confidence in Morsi and his administration, had collected over 22 million signatures before mass protests erupted on June 30.  This is devastating for his Freedom and Justice Party (the Muslim Brotherhood's political party) considering that Morsi was only elected with about 13 million votes.

On July 1 the Egyptian military issued an ultimatum to Morsi in a televised statement, General Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, Egypt's Defense Minister, threatening that if Morsi fails to solve the crisis the military will “be obliged by its patriotic and historic responsibilities and by its respect for the demands of the great Egyptian people to announce a roadmap for the future and the steps for overseeing its implementation, with participation of all patriotic and sincere parties and movements.” The announcement was met by raucous excitement, and military helicopters trailing Egyptian flags flying over Tahrir square were met cheers.   Many activists have greeted the military’s threat with approval, including Mahmoud Badr, a spokesman associated with the tamarod campaign, saying that the ultimatum “crowns our movement.”

But if the year of Egypt’s rule under the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) should have taught Egyptians anything it is this: Beware of Egyptian generals bearing gifts.

Now making a comeback, the popular slogan “the people and the army are one hand” was wildly popular after Hosni Mubarak’s departure on February 11, 2011. Indeed it was the military’s refusal to participate in Mubarak’s oppression that led to his eventual ouster. But it is tragically short-sighted to view the army as purely expressing solidarity. The military has been the ultimate power in Egypt since the 1952 officer’s rebellion, and after sixty years of rule they have gotten use to their position of power, notoriously associated with corruption funded in large part by US foreign aid.

Activists in Egypt need to understand that the ultimate political power in Egypt is and has always been the military. Mubarak was the face of this power and the military supported him until continued support became impossible. A year of SCAF rule made it clear that the military powers did not have much interest in governing so much as they did in finding ways of maintaining their power and privilege.

Under SCAF's leadership, Egypt’s activists witnessed numerous violent encounters with the state, including the Battle of Muhammad Mahmoud Street, and the Maspero massacre, to name but a few. Moreover, Morsi’s economic perils, though they certainly accelerated during his administration, were nevertheless crises continued from the period of SCAF rule. Moreover, while Morsi and the military bosses did not see eye to eye on many issues, it is apparent that they had a modus vivendi not the least of which included special provisions in Morsi’s constitution that safeguarded that privileged status, including military trials for civilians.

It is obvious that Egyptians have had enough of Morsi, and it would be mad to demand Egyptians to put up with his ineptitude for another three years. However, arguing that Morsi must step down and that civilian rule must, even temporarily, be swept away by the military and for the military is no solution at all. The premise that the military is a sufficient institution for the transition to democracy is evidentially false. The SCAF model readily demonstrated this absurdity. The military is not the answer to the problem; the military is the underlying, ultimate problem, the key obstacle to be overcome if Egypt is to ever find stability and its citizens find the freedom and dignity that they currently demand.

The solution in the short term is obviously Morsi’s resignation followed by elections, but the long term goal for Egyptians must be the reigning in of military privilege and power that has gone too long unchecked.