Tuesday, December 4, 2012

Where now for Palestine? Series introduction

On 29 November 2012, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) recognized Palestine as a non-member observer state; with 138 for, 9 against, and 41 abstentions, the motion was overwhelmingly supported by the planet Earth. Palestine was explicitly recognized as the Gaza Strip and West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Israel (the current occupier of Palestine) and the United States (the primary financier of the occupation) were the most notable nations among the opposition.

One would hope, in the face of such a massive consensus, that the losers might consider some form of introspection. This has thus far not been the case. Israel has announced that it will proceed with the long-planned construction of the settlement bloc known as E-1. If fully implemented the construction would result in a large scale project on the land between Jerusalem and the illegal settlement Ma’ale Adumim. First, this would result in the de facto annexation of occupied East Jerusalem. Moreover, E-1 would effectively bifurcate the West Bank by restricting access between the north and south to a narrow corridor avoiding new settlements and the already existing military areas which Israel insists are a part of its plan for “defensible borders” as well as a “demilitarized Palestinian state.” The US for its part continued to prove that disdain for Palestinian self-determination is the only thing that can bring Democrats and Republicans together.

The near global recognition of Palestine, regardless of the rather pitiful head-in-the-sand detractors, is a monumental achievement. However, as has anyone will observe, the reality of occupation and continued Israeli sovereignty over Palestine has not changed and is not likely to do so anytime soon.

I had a brief twitter exchange with a Palestinian yesterday who remarked:

Lena Ibrahim: How do we move forward? …and I personally don’t believe the answer to the current 1 apartheid state is a “2 state solution.”
E/A: Middle East: The trick, as far as I can tell, is breaking through to the people of Israel. The people running the [government] are lost causes.
Lena Ibrahim: I agree but I think that’s really tough. It will take generations even after peace to change racist perception by Israelis… only because that’s really all they are taught about the Palestinians, very negative and racist stigmas.”
E/A: Middle East: I agree. That’s why I advocate radical nonviolent activism and dialogue—NOT NEGOTIATIONS. Only way to break those views

 Of course, this exchange requires quite a bit of unpacking, and I hope to dig a bit deeper in the remainder of this series. But I’d like to set out some initial thoughts before going much deeper. 

1) An outsider, like myself, prescribing and advocating nonviolence for people who routinely suffer terror and oppression at the hands of power is always problematic. This is a critique I am all too conscious of. However, accepting the premise that dialogue and interaction with the Israeli populace—as opposed to the ineffectual and/or harmful negotiations pursued by the current Palestinian leadership—is the key to a fundamental change of dynamic between Israel and Palestine, nonviolence is simply the most practical way forward. Setting aside all conceptions of flowery rhetoric on the “goodness” of nonviolence, I would ask the skeptics and critics of nonviolence to accept the fact that Israel is a democracy; it’s intractable, far-right politicians are elected and preserved by popular opinion. Rockets and bombs are no more likely to evoke empathy among Israelis than blockades and massacres are likely to evoke submission among Palestinians. One caveat I would like to add is that there are too Palestinian perceptions that would have to change. Palestinians, just like their Israeli counterparts, are “taught… very negative and racist stigmas.” The difference, I think is that these stigmas would rapidly wither away without the daily reinforcement of Israeli occupation and aggression. 

 2) The reason I oppose negotiations is because there is very little, at the moment, to negotiate about. On the issue of Palestinian refugees’ right of return: even if one rejects mainstream academia’s conclusion that Israel expelled approximately 750,000 Palestinians in 1948 and accepts Israel’s narrative that they simply left of their own volition for fear of war, these refugees still have the right to return to their homeland according to international law. On the issue of territory: Israel imposed its sovereignty over the Gaza Strip and West Bank (including East Jerusalem) after it conquered the territory during the 1967 war; gaining territory through conquest is prohibited by international law; settlements and other forms of unilateral Israeli expansion have rightly been denounced as illegal since 1967 and remain as such today. On the issue of “demilitarization”: A neutered Palestinian state that relies on Israel for its security, is forbidden to make independent treaties, and does not have control over its borders, airspace and coastal waters, is neither sovereign nor independent and has thus never been nor will be an acceptable substitute for an actual Palestinian state. The goal for Palestinians, as far as I can tell, is getting the Israeli populace—and eventually the Israeli leadership—to understand this. However, it only takes an informed glance at the history of the so-called “peace process” to determine that negotiations are merely a forum for Palestinian capitulation, rather than real political settlement.  

3) A successful campaign of nonviolence would require a massive amount of mobilization and consensus among Palestinian society—this includes the Palestinian leadership, heretofore complicit in the Israeli occupation. The premise of nonviolence, at its heart, is refusal to acknowledge and obey the avatars of power, however this is requires an active, provocative process. The Palestinian Authority (PA) that currently operates as a subcontractor of Palestinian oppression will have to be reformed and reconstructed; Hamas will have to be confronted about its use of armed resistance; indeed these should be the first targets of change for activists in Palestine. Hamas, strange as it may sound, is much more likely to consider the measure than is the PA. Hamas has shown interest in a long term ceasefire, and appear willing to reconsider armed resistance. The PA, however, while tacitly supporting certain nonviolent gestures, relies politically, financially, and materially on playing their part in the Oslo model of Palestinian oppression. The recent recognition by the UNGA, however, provides numerous opportunities for the PA to shed such shackles. 

The objective of this series will be to add specificity the arguments listed above. The blue print for the series is first to address specific criticisms and shortcomings of nonviolence, and how this relates to a possible Palestinian movement. In Part 2, I wanted to briefly (and somewhat inadequately) address the history—successes and failures—of nonviolent activism, armed resistance, and negotiations in the in the last two decades of so. Finally, followed by specific prescriptions both for Palestinian and international activists as well as for, hopefully, a modified more activist PA that could embrace and facilitate such a movement in Part 3. 

I would welcome appreciate comments and thoughts regarding: 1) Criticisms/thoughts on nonviolence; 2) the appeal of armed resistance; 3) the benefit of negotiations; and 4) your personal ideas on specific nonviolent strategies. I will give all comments consideration as I work through this series. 

Follow me on Twitter at @Adam_Wes_S and on Facebook at Expert/Activist: Middle East.

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