Why Egypt Needs a National Dialogue and Why it Won't Get One

Egypt's presidential election was decided long ago. Though Egyptians--at the time of this writing--have yet to vote, Abdul Fattah El-Sisi is sure to win due to a political environment defined intimidation, exclusion, and state-sponsored propaganda. However, given that the election is already decided, there is no reason to wait when considering what the country needs next. Given the divisive state of Egyptian society right now, it is critical that the country find away to reunite, and the best way to complete this process is by way of a national dialogue.

Recent polling has discovered that 38% of Egyptians maintain a favorable view of the Muslim Brotherhood. After the abysmal performance and subsequent military-expulsion of Muhammad Morsi, this comes as a surprise to many--including veteran observers. But this new information further confirms that the rift is widening as well as calcifying, especially since the government chose to ban the group as a terrorist organization. Moreover political violence has become an unfortunate daily occurrence, the likes of which was until very recently completely foreign to Egypt.

Yemen's recent experience with its National Dialogue Conference (NDC) provides the most invaluable lessons. Though the government has since staggered when it comes to implementation--due to a carefully orchestrated political deadlock--the process itself was productive and inclusive. By holding smaller sessions throughout the country, Yemen's NDC was able to cultivate national conversations while airing grievances between otherwise intractable political and social foes. The mechanisms of the NDC led to a long, detailed list of recommendations meant to guide the Constitution Drafting Committee as it prepares Yemen's first post-revolutionary legal code. Egypt, which has yet to pursue a trans-social dialogue processes, has fumbled through three different constitutions since 2011--the latest draft of which was ratified by the public in a dismal referendum with only 38% support.

Egypt's nizam will no doubt remain antithetical to Egyptian solidarity, and it is doubtful that Sisi would have the courage or will to spend political capital in defying the military interests in such away. Indeed, if the government now were to organize such a process it would no doubt resemble the Bahraini model--with loyalists talking among themselves while the opposition boycotted or was excluded altogether. Nonetheless, this should not preclude activists and civil society professionals from mimicking the mechanisms of national dialogue. Dialogue from the bottom up could serve as an important mode of repairing the fractures within Egyptian society and alleviating the currently toxic level of polarization.