Why Egypt Needs a National Dialogue and Why it Won't Get One

Egypt's presidential election was decided long ago. Though Egyptians--at the time of this writing--have yet to vote, Abdul Fattah El-Sisi is sure to win due to a political environment defined intimidation, exclusion, and state-sponsored propaganda. However, given that the election is already decided, there is no reason to wait when considering what the country needs next. Given the divisive state of Egyptian society right now, it is critical that the country find away to reunite, and the best way to complete this process is by way of a national dialogue.

Recent polling has discovered that 38% of Egyptians maintain a favorable view of the Muslim Brotherhood. After the abysmal performance and subsequent military-expulsion of Muhammad Morsi, this comes as a surprise to many--including veteran observers. But this new information further confirms that the rift is widening as well as calcifying, especially since the government chose to ban the group as a terrorist organization. Moreover political violence has become an unfortunate daily occurrence, the likes of which was until very recently completely foreign to Egypt.

Yemen's recent experience with its National Dialogue Conference (NDC) provides the most invaluable lessons. Though the government has since staggered when it comes to implementation--due to a carefully orchestrated political deadlock--the process itself was productive and inclusive. By holding smaller sessions throughout the country, Yemen's NDC was able to cultivate national conversations while airing grievances between otherwise intractable political and social foes. The mechanisms of the NDC led to a long, detailed list of recommendations meant to guide the Constitution Drafting Committee as it prepares Yemen's first post-revolutionary legal code. Egypt, which has yet to pursue a trans-social dialogue processes, has fumbled through three different constitutions since 2011--the latest draft of which was ratified by the public in a dismal referendum with only 38% support.

Egypt's nizam will no doubt remain antithetical to Egyptian solidarity, and it is doubtful that Sisi would have the courage or will to spend political capital in defying the military interests in such away. Indeed, if the government now were to organize such a process it would no doubt resemble the Bahraini model--with loyalists talking among themselves while the opposition boycotted or was excluded altogether. Nonetheless, this should not preclude activists and civil society professionals from mimicking the mechanisms of national dialogue. Dialogue from the bottom up could serve as an important mode of repairing the fractures within Egyptian society and alleviating the currently toxic level of polarization.

Towards an End of Impunity in the Middle East and North Africa

The issue of impunity forms the axis around which all abuses in the Middle East and North Africa continue to revolve. Even where there are legal means to ban abuses or to ensure personal rights, repression continues largely because institutions are too weak or too unwilling to hold violators accountable and to uphold the rule of law. The emphasis of reform efforts--by both activists and international actors--should be oriented toward projects that focus on (1) cultivating cultures of transparency and accountability to ensure professional, impartial execution of the rule of law, (2) empowering the state structures with the capacity to control security forces, and (3) creating an apolitical judicial environment that is able to prosecute members of the state without fear of interference or professional and personal reprisals.

Confronting impunity should begin by opening up what are now very opaque, at times disorganized judiciaries and law enforcement agencies. This is best demonstrated by the lack of transparency in Yemen. Conditions in the country are largely eroded by corruption; money is either required to compel security forces to enforce the law or is a persistent option to convince them to ignore it. Perhaps one of the weakest states in the region, the lack of effective record keeping only serves to complicate basic rule of law procedures. Very little information or access is available to citizens or observers to assess how long certain detainees have been held, whether they've been charged, etc, in part because of government dysfunction and opacity.

Aside from external review, security forces act with impunity first when they elude internal oversight and accountability. This is particularly true in Egypt where security forces operate unmoored from state control, demonstrating an internal cohesion despite a continuous lack of loyalty to a given government--the police forces have been given autonomy for decades and they are intent to maintain it. The Morsi government had virtually no control over security forces, and though the interim government demonstrated a better relationship with police forces, this had no effect on repressive practices. Abdel Fattah El-Sisi will be the next president of Egypt, and his political ascension has been accompanied by improved relations between the police and the state. In other circumstances this may open the door for reform, however this would require a government that was truly interested in reform and had the will to engage its political capital on such a difficult and contested issue as security sector reform; Sisi, to say the least, does not seem predisposed to such a government.

In a similar vein, many of Libya’s human rights abuses stem a lack of government control over the parts of security forces comprised of post-revolutionary militias that have yet to demobilize or completely declare allegiances to the state. It is difficult to say whether various abuses occur more or less today than they did under Qaddafi, but what is demonstrably true is that many armed factions are now far removed from any political or judicial hierarchy in the absence of the Qaddafi regime’s monopolization of violence. Torture, wrongful imprisonment, religious persecution, sexual assault, and other abuses have all occurred at the hands of these militias, yet the government continues to utilize such forces in various parts of the country to compliment its own security apparatus. As yet, the government has not demonstrated an ability or will to investigate and punish abuses. The development of a strong constitution is the first step, but ultimately the fate of the country will rest upon whether these quasi (or wholly) independent groups can be convinced to declare loyalty to said document and then be contained by its legal parameters. The way forward for Libya thus lies not only in reform and institution building, but these difficult processes are further complicated by the thorny process of conflict resolution and negotiation.

The Egyptian judiciary’s role in selectively prosecuting and convicting people for transgressions is important to consider. Torture, arbitrary arrest, and extrajudicial killings are more commonplace today than they were in 2010, and there have been few attempts to investigate abuses, fewer attempts to press charges, and fewer still successful convictions. Though few members of the security forces--much less the former regime--have been successfully convicted for the deaths of protesters during 2011 uprising or its subsequent violence, numerous citizens and activists and have been condemned. The recent disturbing mass convictions of Muslim Brotherhood supporters and affiliates has rightly brought down international condemnation and concern upon Egypt, but what failed to garner as much outrage was the quiet acquittal of police officers implicated in extrajudicial killings. Though the Egyptian judiciary has independent fragments, cases and courts are still managed in a highly politicized fashion to ensure that the state, particularly the military and the police, can ensure their desired outcomes when they wish.

In Yemen, the wider project of protecting the perpetrators of past abuses is more formalized. The uprising was effectively ended by a power-sharing scheme agreed upon by the Joint Meeting Parties and the General People’s Congress--the former ruling party. The most contentious aspect of the agreement was the immunity law that still serves as an obstacle to pursuing the perpetrators of terrible crimes committed during the uprising, including former President Ali Abdullah Saleh himself, who remains free to manipulate Yemeni politics to this day. This power sharing scheme, which so far has done little more than paralyze the government and exclude popular opinion from the transition process, is a microcosm of larger mechanisms at play that impede accountability. Offending members of the security forces and government officials are often treated lightly--if sanctioned all--for abuses, often for political expedience due to various social sensitivities, like tribal connections.

The region, regrettably, does not lack authoritarian regimes where impunity is commonplace, but it should be understood that impunity is not just an aspect of repressive regimes: it is a central component without which the entire game begins to unravel. The first step is addressing transparency within the system; citizens must be able to see and understand the process. Then all institutions and groups acting in the name of the state--security forces, the judiciary, etc.--should be made to conform to a coherent hierarchy that citizens can trust. Finally, a free and independent judiciary should be molded to ensure that members of the state are held to the same standards as the citizens they are charged with ruling over. If more effort was focused on building the capacity of rule of law institutions, these institutions would largely act on their own accord to purge the system of its remaining poisons.

A Crash Course in Iraq’s Electoral Politics

My article breaking down the political players and major issues in the upcoming Iraqi elections was published on The Atlantic Council's MENASource blog.

"On April 30, Iraq will hold parliamentary elections featuring a total of 9,040 candidates from 142 parties, including forty-one blocs and coalitions, all competing for just 328 parliamentary seats. The result of the 2010 parliamentary elections carried Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiya bloc to a narrow electoral victory, but was eventually defeated by a coalition of majority-Shia parties to ensure a second term for Nuri al-Maliki. As Maliki seeks another four years as Iraq’s prime minister, the political scene has changed dramatically and issues, both new and old, take center stage as voters weigh their options. 

"Security remains at the forefront of Iraqi politics. The civil war in Syria and the transnational jihadist organizations’ activities on Iraq’s western border have exploited and exacerbated long running grievances between the local Sunni population and the central government. The lingering "de-baathification” legacy has been used by Maliki, some say, to discriminate against critics, particularly Sunnis. Following the December 2013 crackdown on the protest camp in Anbar province’s capital of Ramadi and the arrest of prominent Sunni leaders, clashes erupted throughout the province. Currently, organizations like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other militant groups have come to temporary agreements with local anti-government militias and tribal groups. The loss of control in Anbar has threatened the rest of the country as well, with militants seizing control of the Fallujah Dam and closing off the Euphrates river. Its closure has caused flooding in some areas and extreme water scarcity in others. Elsewhere, ISIS forces and other militant groups have staged attacks in Shia neighborhoods, threatening to reignite sectarian tensions and mobilize independent militias. This recent escalation in violence has already claimed 2,650 lives since the beginning of the year."

Read the full article here.

The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Human Rights in the Transitioning Countries

My article contrasting the state of human rights in before and after the Arab Spring was published on The Atlantic Council's MENASource blog. This article was subsequently recommended by Foreign Policy Magazine's Democracy Lab.

"More than three years have passed since tide of the Arab Spring swept through the region, carrying away in its undertow three Presidents-for-life as well as one Brother-Leader. At the heart of the movements that coalesced in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen was a desire for democratic reform and a final sunset on the decades-old systems of repression and human rights abuses. However, a comparative view of the current state of human rights today versus that of 2010 reveals the emerging patterns defining the people's relationship with the state in the post-Arab Spring era. The US Department of State’s annual review of human rights provides an opportunity to assess what progress has been made as well as how very far the transitioning countries have left to go."

Read the full article here.

Reform or Insurgency in Bahrain

My article on the need for reform in Bahrain was published on The Atlantic Council's MENASource blog.

"The use of more violent means of confrontation in Bahrain is becoming more prevalent—at least on the part of a minority of anti-regime groups—as state security forces continue to use repressive measures against dissidents, employing beatings, tear gas, and birdshot on otherwise peaceful demonstrators. The deterioration in security has also created space for extremism to rear its head. On February 14, amidst protests marking the third anniversary of Bahrain’s uprising, the militant group al-Ashtar Brigades bombed a minibus carrying police officers in Dih west of Manama, wounding several; another bombing targeted police near the country’s airport, killing one. On Monday, another bombing occurred during confrontations with protesters.

"The situation in Bahrain—coupled with an obstinate lack of movement from Bahrain’s international partners—is wholly unsustainable. Unlike other Gulf States, Bahrain’s monarchy has a much narrower scope of loyal elites with which to collude and far more modest coffers with which to offset popular grievances."

Read the full article here.

To Confront Yemen’s Security Dilemmas, Start With Security Forces

My article on the desperate need for security sector reform in Yemen was published on The Atlantic Council's MENASource blog.

"Despite the conclusion of Yemen’s National Dialogue, violence continues to plague the country, most notably with clashes between tribesman and separatists pressing for greater autonomy and government forces that have lost their confidence. The recent incidents in al-Dali’ province illustrate this acutely, where tribesmen and the Thirty-Third Armored Brigade erupted in conflict after local militants associated with Southern separatists fired at a water convoy en route to the brigade’s base; the incident escalated into a conflict defined by an all too typical, indiscriminate military shelling of civilian infrastructure. The fighting in al-Dali’ centers on a specific military outfit: the Thirty-Third Armored Brigade is infamous among locals, especially after its December shelling of a funeral killed more than twenty people—some of them children. The subsequent investigation of the incident has been kept confidential and no prosecutions were made in its wake.

"Echoing wider calls in the country for local autonomy and reflecting the National Dialogue Conference’s (NDC) call for decentralization, the local tribes have demanded the Brigade be removed from al-Dali’—and the province’s security manager agrees, saying, “Its existence in the governorate is provoking further Southern calls for secession.” The central government informed the Brigade in late January that its leading officer was to be dismissed, the bare minimum one would expect after an incident like the December shelling. The brigade refused the order, choosing instead to fortify their compound and surround it with tanks."

Read the full article here.

Dictatorships: Just Do It

Essentially, the concept of nation branding functions as a (normally privatized) form of propaganda. Because suppressing dissent, torturing protest organizers and using excessive force on unarmed demonstrators generally requires all hands on deck, autocratic regimes are occasionally forced outsource the management of their foreign propaganda to smaller public relations firms abroad.

In September, just a month after the biggest massacre of civilians in Egypt’s history, it was announced that the country's military bosses overseeing the mass killing were looking to hire professional apologists and advocates in Washington. I know what you’re thinking, “You mean that just one month after nearly 600 civilians were killed and nearly 4,000 people were injured in a pretty one-sided battle between state security forces and supporters of a democratically-elected president who those security forces had forced out, the state began shopping around the contract to advocate on its behalf in Washington? Why, golly, who want such a contract?”

Dear reader, let me tell you: The Glover Park Group! And think for a second. How much money would it take for you to sell your soul and go to the hill every day to convince legislators that a bunch murderous oligarchs are in fact worthy of taxpayer-funded military aid? How’s $250,000 a month sound? Some people would have serious problems with this arrangement. These are what I like to call “decent, reasonable human beings.” On the other hand there are people who would jump at the chance. In the immortal words of Willard Romney, “Corporations are people, my friend.” Unfortunately, as far as people go, corporations are sociopaths.

Take Bell Pottinger for instance. They have a reputation as being the definitive global advocates of the earth’s most powerful scum. From Belarus to Bahrain, Bell Pottinger seems to have no qualms about defending the most terrible opponents of human freedom and dignity around the world. In 2011, undercover reporters from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism went in to Bell Pottinger’s office posing as representatives of the Government of Uzbekistan and of said country’s cotton industry. Topic of the day: how best can Uzbekistan polish its awful record on the use of child labor in its cotton fields. During the interview Bell Pottinger representatives bragged to undercover journalist about their influence with the UK’s government and their ability to use “dark arts” to scrub their reputation on the internet. It was an embarrassing scandal for the firm, but fear not, corporations don’t have feels, and Bell Pottinger’s dark arts continue to be practiced. The firm is currently in the hunt for Bahrain’s new public relations contract.

“Nation branding.” The phrase itself should make you feel dirty. Really dirty. Like a Hosni-Mubarak-giving-you-a-foot-massage kind of dirty. The reason being: I work full-time at unpaid internship that pushes the US government and international actors to put more pressure on the government of Bahrain. It can be difficult working for no pay, sure, but I really love the work I do and the projects I get to work on, like drafting letters to congressmen, documenting human rights abuses, etc.

What really screws me up though, is that somewhere out there is a ‘Mirror, Mirror’ version of me interning at some soulless PR firm drafting press releases selling Bahrain as a great place for an international sporting event—if you consider driving a car really, really fast a sport. Don’t let political prisoners wasting away due to lack of treatment bum you out; never mind persistent allegations of torture; ignore the largely foreign police force imported from abroad to bludgeon the locals: This spring break it’s “Destination Bahrain: A nation on a Journey!”

Somewhere there are people as passionate about subverting natural inclinations of human solidarity (aka “dark arts”) as I am about undermining the efforts of despots.